Eliezer has a longer explanation of his view here.
My understanding of his argument is: there are a lot of contingencies that reflect how and whether humans are kind. Because there are so many contingencies, it is somewhat unlikely that aliens would go down a similar route, and essentially impossible for ML. So maybe aliens have a 5% probability of being nice and ML systems have ~0% probability of being nice. I think this argument is just talking about why we shouldn't have update too much from humans, and there is an important background assumption that kindness is super weird and so won't be produced very often by other processes, i.e. the only reason to think it might happen is that it happened in the single case we observed.
I find this pretty unconvincing. He lists like 10 things (humans need to trade favors, we're not smart enough to track favors and kinship explicitly, and we tend to be allied with nearby humans so want to be nice to those around us, we use empathy to model other humans, and we had religion and moral realism for contingent reasons, we weren't optimized too much once we were smart enough that our instrumental reasoning screens off kindness heuristics).
But no argument is given for why these are unusually kindness-inducing settings of the variables. And the outcome isn't like a special combination of all of them, they each seem like factors that contribute randomly. It's just a lot of stuff mixing together.
Presumably there is no process that ensures humans have lots of kindness-inducing features (and we didn't select kindness as a property for which humans were notable, we're just asking the civilization-independent question "does our AI kill us"). So if you list 10 random things that make humans more kind, it strongly suggests that other aliens will also have a bunch of random things that make them more kind. It might not be 10, and the net effect might be larger or smaller. But:
As a matter of formal reasoning, listing more and more contingencies that combine apparently-additively tends to decrease rather than increase the variance of kindness across the population. If there was just a single random thing about humans that drove kindness it would be more plausible that we're extreme. If you are listing 10 things then things are going to start averaging out (and you expect that your 10 things are cherry-picked to be the ones most relevant to humans, but you can easily list 10 more candidates).
In fact it's easy to list analogous things that could apply to ML (and I can imagine the identical conversation where hypothetical systems trained by ML are talking about how stupid it is to think that evolved life could end up being kind). Most obviously, they are trained in an environment where being kind to humans is a very good instrumental strategy. But they are also trained to closely imitate humans who are known to be kind, they've been operating in a social environment where they are very strongly expected to appear to be kind, etc. Eliezer seems to believe this kind of thing gets you "ice cream and condoms" instead of kindness OOD, but just one sentence ago he explained why similar (indeed, superficially much weaker!) factors led to humans retaining niceness out of distribution. I just don't think we have the kind of a priori asymmetry or argument here that would make you think humans are way kinder than models. Yeah it can get you to ~50% or even somewhat lower, but ~0% seems like a joke.
There was one argument that I found compelling, which I would summarize as: humans were optimized while they were dumb. If evolution had kept optimizing us while we got smart, eventually we would have stopped being so kind. In ML we just keep on optimizing as the system gets smart. I think this doesn't really work unless being kind is a competitive disadvantage for ML systems on the training distribution. But I do agree that if if you train your AI long enough on cases where being kind is a significant liability, it will eventually stop being kind.
Short version: if the future is filled with weird artificial and/or alien minds having their own sort of fun in weird ways that I might struggle to understand with my puny meat-brain, then I'd consider that a win. When I say that I expect AI to destroy everything we value, I'm not saying that the future is only bright if humans-in-particular are doing human-specific things. I'm saying that I expect AIs to make the future bleak and desolate, and lacking in fun or wonder of any sort[1].
Here's a parable for you:
Here's another parable for you:
There are many different sorts of futures that minds can want.
Ours are a very narrow and low-dimensional band, in that wide space.
When I say it's important to make the AIs care about valuable stuff, I don't mean it's important to make them like vanilla ice cream more than chocolate ice cream (as I do).
I'm saying something more like: we humans have selfish desires (like for vanilla ice cream), and we also have broad inclusive desires (like for everyone to have ice cream that they enjoy, and for alien minds to feel alien satisfaction at the fulfilment of their alien desires too). And it's important to get the AI on board with those values.
But those values aren't universally compelling, just because they're broader or more inclusive. Those are still our values.
The fact that we think fondly of the ant-queen and wish her to fulfill her desires, does not make her think fondly of us, nor wish us to fulfill our desires.
That great inclusive cosmopolitan dream is about others, but it's written in our hearts; it's not written in the stars. And if we want the AI to care about it too, then we need to figure out how to get it written into the AI's heart too.
It seems to me that many of my disagreements with others in this space come from them hearing me say "I want the AI to like vanilla ice cream, as I do", whereas I hear them say "the AI will automatically come to like the specific and narrow thing (broad cosmopolitan value) that I like".
As is often the case in my writings, I'm not going to spend a bunch of time arguing for my position.
At the moment I'm just trying to state my position, in the hopes that this helps us skip over the step where people think I'm arguing for carbon chauvanism.
(For more reading on why someone might hold this position, consider the metaethics sequence on LessWrong.)
I'd be stoked if we created AIs that are the sort of thing that can make the difference between an empty gallery, and a gallery with someone in it to appreciate the art (where a person to enjoy the gallery makes all the difference). And I'd be absolutely thrilled if we could make AIs that care as we do, about sentience and people everywhere, however alien they may be, and about them achieving their weird alien desires.
But I don't think we're on track for that.
And if you, too, have the vision of the grand pan-sentience cosmopolitan dream--as might cause you to think I'm a human-centric carbon chauvinist, if you misread me--then hear this: we value the same thing, and I believe it is wholly at risk.
at least within the ~billion light-year sphere of influence that Earth-originated life seems pretty likely to have; maybe there are distant aliens and hopefully a bunch of aliens will do fun stiff with the parts of the universe under their influence, but it's still worth ensuring that the great resources at Earth's disposal go towards fun and love and beauty and wonder and so on, rather than towards bleak desolation. ↩︎