ARC explores the challenge of extracting information from AI systems that isn't directly observable in their outputs, i.e "eliciting latent knowledge." They present a hypothetical AI-controlled security system to demonstrate how relying solely on visible outcomes can lead to deceptive or harmful results. The authors argue that developing methods to reveal an AI's full understanding of a situation is crucial for ensuring the safety and reliability of advanced AI systems.
This post contains similar content to a forthcoming paper, in a framing more directly addressed to readers already interested in and informed about alignment. I include some less formal thoughts, and cut some technical details. That paper, A Corrigibility Transformation: Specifying Goals That Robustly Allow For Goal Modification, will be linked here when released on arXiv, hopefully within the next few weeks.
Ensuring that AI agents are corrigible, meaning they do not take actions to preserve their existing goals, is a critical component of almost any plan for alignment. It allows for humans to modify their goal specifications for an AI, as well as for AI agents to learn goal specifications over time, without incentivizing the AI to interfere with that process. As an extreme example of corrigibility’s...
Nice paper! Thanks for working on it. I feel a bit embarrassed that I didn't notice when this first came out and it took me until this week to take the time to read it. I'm going to adopt a critical stance here, but just to be clear, I strong-upvoted and very much want more research like this to exist. Please let me know if I'm misunderstanding the ideas.
Okay. Let's get into the critique...
In my investigation of corrigibility, I've been particularly interested in what Eliezer calls "the hard problem of corrigibility", wher...
New paper and blog post by Geoffrey Irving, Paul Christiano, and Dario Amodei (the OpenAI safety team).
Preface for LessWrong: When I think back on my most cherished memories of this community, I return to those honoring defiance in pursuit of goodness:
I cannot return to you and say “I defied and then I won.” But I’m at least here to say “I defied.”
I recommend reading this article on my website since the embeds and typography work better there: click here.
In January, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officers...
Respect
(Thanks to Ajeya Cotra, Nick Beckstead, and Jared Kaplan for helpful comments on a draft of this post.)
I really don’t want my AI to strategically deceive me and resist my attempts to correct its behavior. Let’s call an AI that does so egregiously misaligned (for the purpose of this post).
Most possible ML techniques for avoiding egregious misalignment depend on detailed facts about the space of possible models: what kind of thing do neural networks learn? how do they generalize? how do they change as we scale them up?
But I feel like we should be possible to avoid egregious misalignment regardless of how the empirical facts shake out--it should be possible to get a model we build to do at least roughly what we want. So I’m interested in trying...
Iirc, the translation example was in some comment on one of the AI Alignment blog posts from ~2016, though I can't find it right now.
I wrote about translation in connection with IDA in this 2016 comment thread, although the form of the problem I wrote down is different enough from Paul's 2020 writeup that I'm not sure how much connection there is between the two.
I'm reminded of my 2024 comment on the progression of model-free to model-based systems and thus increasing sophistication about reasoning/planning/searching and ability to make reward the optimization target: https://www.alignmentforum.org/posts/yQSmcfN4kA7rATHGK/many-arguments-for-ai-x-risk-are-wrong?commentId=4bNxEBNCnjuGwSCgi