AI Alignment Forum

Four LLM loss functions → four flavors of LLM misalignment

All targets which one might use for reinforcement learning seem to be subject to Goodhart's Law, in a sense. If we treat them as an imperfect measures of "alignment", then the "misalignment" we see is simply the difference (in concept-space) between the measure (as far as it can actually be faithfully implemented) and alignment: * The difference between "user approved" and "aligned with actual interests" is "user approved but not actually aligned with their interest", i.e. sycophancy, and that's the result of doing RLHF; * The difference between "passes the tests" and "aligned with actual interests" is "tests pass without actually having solved the exercise", i.e. cheating (whether by manipulating the tests or stealing the answer sheet), and that's the result of doing RLVR; * The difference between "judged correct by peer" and "aligned with actual interests" is "provides convincing, hard to verify, apparently-successful outputs", i.e. the weird "slippery" outputs @ryan_greenblatt alludes to that result from RLAIF. If you use more than one of these RL techniques, you get a mixture of the results, eliciting whatever seems to fit the presumed grader best. So far, I hope I have understood you correctly. But then, what's the solution? Reinforcement learning on whatever best measure of "alignment" we have, that is, reduce the difference between model behavior and our best measure of perfect alignment / Yudkowskian "Coherent Extrapolated Volition"? Well, that would necessitate that we have a theory of alignment and could quantify and measure it with high fidelity. And, well, we don't seem to have that. But in a sense, we do have something like it: I see all of the above failure modes in children and particularly in students. There might, therefore, be something to learn from pedagogical sciences on how you help children grow up to be broadly aligned members of society (which arguably sometimes works), despite not having a rigorous theory of what "the good" is in humans. How does one grow a good human? I suspect it's murky and benefits from young humans being malleable and not perfectly ruthless responders to optimization pressure. Might we go back to imitative learning on already-grown humans, then — the very narrow subset of the best-aligned humans we know of? Basically curate the dataset further and further, until the failure modes disappear? Or do we have to use the mechanisms we know are baked into humans (is this the "brain-like AGI" agenda)?

habryka16d*2619

Returning to ARC

I am confused about the conjunction of these two sections: > Modern AI systems are not aligned with human intent. We will likely train increasingly powerful models that take unintended actions in order to succeed at their task (or appear to succeed at their task). and > The community is doing a lot of great alignment research, but it's important to recognize there is a significant risk that it doesn't scale to superhuman AI. If you made me guess I'd say that there's a 20-30% chance[4] that existing methods for alignment and control break down before we reach broadly superhuman AI. Like, you say in the first section "we are failing to align modern AI systems with human intent", and then I interpret you in the second section as saying "in 70%-80% of worlds current AI models stay aligned with human intent (or stay controlled by humans)". But this doesn't make any sense. There is a 0% chance that modern AI systems "stay aligned with human intent" because as you say, they are not currently. And I understand that you probably mean something like "we will figure out how to align or control systems before they become superintelligent", but describing this as "our current methods scale to superintelligence" doesn't make any sense. Our current methods don't scale to the capability levels of current systems, so how would it make sense to describe them as "scaling to Superintelligence"?

Arjun Pitchanathan15d130

Why I Left Google DeepMind

Jeff Dean has now left Google after 27 years.

32habryka

I think this post might be the best one of all the MIRI dialogues. I also feel confused about how to relate to the MIRI dialogues overall. A lot of the MIRI dialogues consist of Eliezer and Nate saying things that seem really important and obvious to me, and a lot of my love for them comes from a feeling of "this actually makes a bunch of the important arguments for why the problem is hard". But the nature of the argument is kind of closed off. Like, I agree with these arguments, but like, if you believe these arguments, having traction on AI Alignment becomes much harder, and a lot of things that people currently label "AI Alignment" kind of stops feeling real, and I have this feeling that even though a really quite substantial fraction of the people I talk to about AI Alignment are compelled by Eliezer's argument for difficulty, that there is some kind of structural reason that AI Alignment as a field can't really track these arguments. Like, a lot of people's jobs and funding rely on these arguments being false, and also, if these arguments are correct, the space of perspectives on the problem suddenly loses a lot of common ground on how to proceed or what to do, and it isn't really obvious that you even want an "AI Alignment field" or lots of "AI Alignment research organizations" or "AI Alignment student groups". Like, because we don't know how to solve this problem, it really isn't clear what the right type of social organization is, and there aren't obviously great gains from trade, and so from a coalition perspective, you don't get a coalition of people who think these arguments are real. I feel deeply confused about this. Over the last two years, I think I wrongly ended up just kind of investing into an ecosystem of people that somewhat structurally can't really handle these arguments, and makes plans that assume that these arguments are false, and in doing so actually mostly makes the world worse, by having a far too optimistic stance on the differen

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TurnTrout

5Cole Wyeth16h

glad to see this from coming from you. the meme “Reward is not the optimization target” seemed to be causing many people to ignore the increasingly well-supported hypothesis that models are actually seeking reward. Also, reward-seeking IS the optimization target for memory-based meta-learning (models are in fact incentivized to explicitly reason about, explore, and pursue reward in-context). In a sense this means that the meme is actually wrong. @michaelcohen convinced me of this several months ago. It may be that models nevertheless pursue some imperfect proxy of reward because optimization (of the mesa-optimizer) is not strong enough, particularly if models play the training game (which could weaken the optimization pressure on their goals). But since the concept of reward is available from pretraining, it seems quite plausible that models are simply selected to deliberately pursue it early in post-training.

2TurnTrout44m

Can you name an example system?

Cole Wyeth37m10

I’m talking about post-training for current systems, particularly RLVR on rich distributions of long horizon tasks, which incentivizes learning about the reward mechanism “in-context” (the modern rebranding of meta-learning).

3James Payor1d

I have the impression that "reward" is being strategically/instrumentally considered in these transcripts, which seems relevant to my picture if it's true. Like the for the model(s) in question it looks quite relevant to their choices that they believe they are being evaluated, and further that they're being trained/modified based on the reward signal. I'm not sure what they would do if they believed it would "work" to mess with the training (beyond their choices about how to complete local tasks, which do affect what is actually reinforced and the "labs" would do well to know this). It at least seems to me like they would relate to things differently and make different choices if they knew the evaluation wasn't inside the training loop. Overall idk and would like more info, and appreciate you posting this! Also if you or anyone has pointers to poignant parts of the transcripts available (I sure haven't read through everything) that would be great.

Why I Left Google DeepMind

231

TurnTrout

1mo

This is a linkpost for https://turntrout.com/why-i-left-google-deepmind

Preface for LessWrong: When I think back on my most cherished memories of this community, I return to those honoring defiance in pursuit of goodness:

Defying prestigious dogma and searching for raw truth;
Defying social pressure, acting alone to help someone while others watch;
Defying your self-expectations (your “role”), instead searching over lines of cause-and-effect to find a winning pathway;
Defying a powerful foe’s threats, because they only threaten since people like you cave;
Defying the specter of apparent impossibility because you can’t bear to lose.

I cannot return to you and say “I defied and then I won.” But I’m at least here to say “I defied.”

I recommend reading this article on my website since the embeds and typography work better there: click here.

Why I left Google DeepMind

In January, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officers...

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Ramana Kumar1h10

Respect

My research methodology

paulfchristiano

(Thanks to Ajeya Cotra, Nick Beckstead, and Jared Kaplan for helpful comments on a draft of this post.)

I really don’t want my AI to strategically deceive me and resist my attempts to correct its behavior. Let’s call an AI that does so egregiously misaligned (for the purpose of this post).

Most possible ML techniques for avoiding egregious misalignment depend on detailed facts about the space of possible models: what kind of thing do neural networks learn? how do they generalize? how do they change as we scale them up?

But I feel like we should be possible to avoid egregious misalignment regardless of how the empirical facts shake out--it should be possible to get a model we build to do at least roughly what we want. So I’m interested in trying...

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Wei Dai3d30

Iirc, the translation example was in some comment on one of the AI Alignment blog posts from ~2016, though I can't find it right now.

I wrote about translation in connection with IDA in this 2016 comment thread, although the form of the problem I wrote down is different enough from Paul's 2020 writeup that I'm not sure how much connection there is between the two.

Sympathy for both sides of the egregious misalignment debate

Steven Byrnes

2mo

On one side of this debate is Yudkowsky & Soares, who think that (if AI progress continues) we’re on a direct path to egregiously-misaligned, scheming, out-of-control, rogue superintelligence (ASI), not even slightly nice, in the absence of yet-to-be-invented breakthrough technical alignment ideas.

On the other side of this debate is almost everyone who works on or studies LLMs. Some of them are very concerned about egregious scheming, others much less so, and as a group they’re equally or more concerned about lots of other potential AI problems—AI-assisted bioterrorism, AI-assisted dictatorships, etc. And if they’re concerned about egregious misalignment and scheming, they’ll often say that it would come about through being in too much of a rush, or careless programmers, or bad actors, etc., as opposed to the simpler...

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1plex6d

What are these reasons for expecting existing techniques to hold for the (indefinite?) future? Specifically, it seems plausible/likely to me that if you take some transformerish like architecture and throw enough task based RL compute at it, the general program search finds genuinely dangerous agentic programs which could execute a takeover, whether or not they bootstrap themselves to novel architectures. Specifically, I before reading this post would have assigned pretty high probability to a non caricatured version of: [...] which goes something like: There are missing insights which cause humans to still do things LLMs can't. As those are found, LLMs might jump way ahead very abruptly as it is way superhuman in many ways already and if a system matched humans in all ways while keeping these skills it would take over pretty easily I suspect. This could happen even while remaining on roughly transformerlike architecture, e.g. via [redacted and sent by DM]. Curious why you think this doesn't hang together and seems like a caricature to you.

Steven Byrnes3d21

There are missing insights which cause humans to still do things LLMs can't. As those are found, LLMs might jump way ahead very abruptly as it is way superhuman in many ways already and if a system matched humans in all ways while keeping these skills it would take over pretty easily I suspect.

Oh, I wasn’t talking about changing the LLM learning algorithm, training approach, etc. Of course if you change any of those things, then you can get different results for both capabilities and alignment. I meant, like, I don’t expect LLMs as trained today to pass some threshold beyond which they will logically reason themselves into being egregiously misaligned.

5Steven Byrnes3d

I mean, I certainly have concerns about LLM alignment (see Bonus section). But the opposite of “AI will definitely be egregiously misaligned (in the absence of new breakthrough alignment ideas)” (per Yudkowsky, Soares, me) is not “AI will definitely not be egregiously misaligned…” but rather “AI might or might not be egregiously misaligned…”. And arguing against that is much harder, because you need to argue not only that there are potential problems but that these problems are inevitable, with no possible adequate mitigations within the domain of known techniques. So then we need to start going through possible mitigations to LLM misalignment, and whether those mitigations are durable solutions versus merely delaying the inevitable. And in near-future-LLM world, there are definitely mitigations! Like, LLMs today are obviously not being trained using best known practices for alignment. E.g. the companies keep accidentally using buggy RL environments that reward the LLM-in-training for cheating, and they keep accidentally exposing chains-of-thought to the reward functions, etc. They could fix that. And on top of that, there’s a whole world of other “obvious” mitigations that we would have to talk about. E.g. what if we do another round of DPO after the RLVR, but the DPO is a team of super-conscientious world experts spending hours judging each output? What if the humans are scrutinizing the chain-of-thought too? Or what if we simply limit the amount of RLVR, rather than scaling up RLVR training forever, and instead treat the RLVR phase as a bootstrapping step for massively-scaled-up DPO and RLAIF? How can we make the RLAIF judge models better? Etc. etc. There’s a whole argument tree here, and as of now I’m at least vaguely sympathetic to the LLM people who wind up feeling like the answer is “If we keep using the kinds of LLM training approaches that we’re using today, those future more powerful LLMs might or might not be egregiously misaligned”. (“Vaguely sympatheti

cousin_it's Shortform

cousin_it

cousin_it4d*6-5

A few days ago I tried AI again, after several months of not using it at all. We're dealing with some housing-related matters, and I asked Claude, ChatGPT and Gemini for advice what to do in a certain situation. (I won't give the details here, because they're personal and not that important for my point.) All three models independently gave the same advice, which sounded really convincing to me. But we have some friends with experience in such matters, who said that following this advice would be catastrophic and we should do the opposite. Eventually we fo... (read more)