Daniel Kokotajlo: > I'm glad OpenAI let you do this, but damnit this was way too small of an investigation team and way too narrowly scoped! > > * They were only allowed to investigate activity that took place from July 7-13, even though the activity started earlier and continued later. Like seriously, why didn't the investigation cover all the other times the agents compromised OpenAI infrastructure and ran wild over it? Why just this particular period of activity? There should be investigations into all the other stuff too! The AIs became cluster admins for god's sake! Why aren't we investigating that? > * They were only allowed to answer a specific list of 7 questions, and in particular were NOT allowed to answer e.g. whether this misaligned activity was part of a broader pattern, or how and why the activity arose, or what else the agents in questions would have been willing to do if circumstances were slightly different. > * They didn't have access to the model responsible for 95% of the activity. More generally it seems like they couldn't do ablation experiments at all? > * They had to use AI to analyze the transcripts--specifically, the same model responsible for some of the bad behavior! Maybe this is fine now but this is laughably unacceptable insofar as the models really are scheming and cooperating. So this methodology would fail catastrophically if we were facing "the real deal" so to speak. > > Reminds me of the investigation into Sam's behavior agreed to during the board crisis, that turned out to basically be more of a coverup.

All targets which one might use for reinforcement learning seem to be subject to Goodhart's Law, in a sense. If we treat them as an imperfect measures of "alignment", then the "misalignment" we see is simply the difference (in concept-space) between the measure (as far as it can actually be faithfully implemented) and alignment: * The difference between "user approved" and "aligned with actual interests" is "user approved but not actually aligned with their interest", i.e. sycophancy, and that's the result of doing RLHF; * The difference between "passes the tests" and "aligned with actual interests" is "tests pass without actually having solved the exercise", i.e. cheating (whether by manipulating the tests or stealing the answer sheet), and that's the result of doing RLVR; * The difference between "judged correct by peer" and "aligned with actual interests" is "provides convincing, hard to verify, apparently-successful outputs", i.e. the weird "slippery" outputs @ryan_greenblatt alludes to that result from RLAIF. If you use more than one of these RL techniques, you get a mixture of the results, eliciting whatever seems to fit the presumed grader best. So far, I hope I have understood you correctly. But then, what's the solution? Reinforcement learning on whatever best measure of "alignment" we have, that is, reduce the difference between model behavior and our best measure of perfect alignment / Yudkowskian "Coherent Extrapolated Volition"? Well, that would necessitate that we have a theory of alignment and could quantify and measure it with high fidelity. And, well, we don't seem to have that. But in a sense, we do have something like it: I see all of the above failure modes in children and particularly in students. There might, therefore, be something to learn from pedagogical sciences on how you help children grow up to be broadly aligned members of society (which arguably sometimes works), despite not having a rigorous theory of what "the good" is in humans. How does one grow a good human? I suspect it's murky and benefits from young humans being malleable and not perfectly ruthless responders to optimization pressure. Might we go back to imitative learning on already-grown humans, then — the very narrow subset of the best-aligned humans we know of? Basically curate the dataset further and further, until the failure modes disappear? Or do we have to use the mechanisms we know are baked into humans (is this the "brain-like AGI" agenda)?

I am confused about the conjunction of these two sections: > Modern AI systems are not aligned with human intent. We will likely train increasingly powerful models that take unintended actions in order to succeed at their task (or appear to succeed at their task). and > The community is doing a lot of great alignment research, but it's important to recognize there is a significant risk that it doesn't scale to superhuman AI. If you made me guess I'd say that there's a 20-30% chance[4] that existing methods for alignment and control break down before we reach broadly superhuman AI. Like, you say in the first section "we are failing to align modern AI systems with human intent", and then I interpret you in the second section as saying "in 70%-80% of worlds current AI models stay aligned with human intent (or stay controlled by humans)". But this doesn't make any sense. There is a 0% chance that modern AI systems "stay aligned with human intent" because as you say, they are not currently. And I understand that you probably mean something like "we will figure out how to align or control systems before they become superintelligent", but describing this as "our current methods scale to superintelligence" doesn't make any sense. Our current methods don't scale to the capability levels of current systems, so how would it make sense to describe them as "scaling to Superintelligence"?