Suppose you’re reflecting on your views on two thorny topics: decision theory and anthropics.

Considering decision problems that don’t involve anthropics (i.e., don’t involve inferences about the world from indexical information), you might find yourself very sympathetic to evidential decision theory (EDT).^[1]
And, considering anthropics problems that don’t involve decisions, you might be pretty compelled by the Self-Indication Assumption (SIA) or the Self-Sampling Assumption (SSA) with a non-minimal reference class. (In this post, I’ll specifically consider SSA with the reference class “observer-moments,”^[2] which I’ll call max-RC-SSA.)
But then you consider decision problems that do involve anthropics, and you get very confused, because some apparently strange things happen. How do you resolve this?

Some people’s response is to reject either EDT or SIA / max-RC-SSA, because they consider various problematic implications of the combination EDT + SIA / max-RC-SSA (hereafter, “anthropically updating EDT”^[3]) to be decisive objections. Such as:^[4]

Diachronic Dutch books (see Briggs (2010) and Oesterheld and Conitzer (2024)); and
“Double-counting” in the sense of accepting bets at odds that don’t match one’s epistemic odds.

The objections above are commonly motivated by a perspective of “pragmatism.”^[5] I’ll define this more precisely in “Pragmatism about anthropics,” but briefly, the pragmatist view says: You have reasonable beliefs if, and only if, you actually use your beliefs to select actions and those actions satisfy decision-theoretic desiderata. And there’s no particular positive reason for having some beliefs otherwise.

I don’t find these objections compelling. In summary, this is because:

I don’t think pragmatism in the above sense is well-motivated, and even by pragmatist standards, anthropic updating isn’t uniformly worse than not updating (given EDT).
1. The claim that you should “use your beliefs to select actions” only seems uncontroversially true when “actions” include making commitments to policies, and actions are selected from among the actions actually available to you. But agents might commit to policies for future actions that differ from actions they’d endorse without commitment. (more; more)
  1. If my indexical information suggests that some world is much more likely than another, and within that world there are agents whose decisions I acausally determine, I see no principled objection to taking actions that account for both these factors. This is consistent with preferring, when I don’t have indexical information, to commit to refuse combinations of bets that result in a certain loss.
2. EDT with min-RC-SSA is also diachronically Dutch-bookable. (more)
3. (Anthropic) beliefs may simply be a primitive for agents, justified by basic epistemic principles. (Compare to discussion in Carlsmith’s “An aside on betting in anthropics.”) (more)
If we reject pragmatism, anthropic updating is justifiable despite its apparently counterintuitive implications.
1. The objections only apply to the combination of anthropic updating with EDT, and only assuming some other conditions (most notably, I’m altruistic towards others in my epistemic situation). Thus, the objections only hold if I’m justified in changing the way I form credences based on my normative principles or these other conditions. I see no reason my epistemology should precisely track these orthogonal factors this way. (more)
2. SIA and max-RC-SSA have independent epistemic justification. (more)

I think it’s defensible to argue that SIA / max-RC-SSA updates just don’t make epistemic sense — indeed I have some sympathy for min-RC-SSA. But that’s a different line of argument than “SIA / max-RC-SSA are problematic because they don’t work well with EDT.”

The broader lesson of this post is that decision theory and anthropics are really complicated. I’m puzzled by the degree of confidence about these topics I often encounter (my past self included), especially in claims that anthropically updating EDT “doesn’t work,” or similar.

Background and definitions

The first two subsections — “Anthropic update rules” and “Updateful vs. updateless EDT” — are sufficiently boring that you might want to start by skipping them, and then only come back when you want to know how exactly I’m defining these terms. Especially if you’re already familiar with anthropics and decision theory. But at least an initial skim would likely help.

Anthropic update rules

Quick, imprecise summary without math-y notation:

Self-Indication Assumption (SIA): “Update towards a world in proportion to how common observations of the given evidence are in that world.”
Maximal-reference-class Self-Sampling Assumption (max-RC-SSA): “Update towards a world in proportion to how relatively common observations of the given evidence are in that world, compared to other observations.”
Minimal-reference-class Self-Sampling Assumption (min-RC-SSA): “Update only by ruling out worlds that are inconsistent with there existing some observation of the given evidence.”

Now for more details that I think will make it less likely people in this discussion talk past each other.

Anthropic update rules are all about how I (for some fixed “I”) form beliefs about:

some world , given
some indexical evidence $I (x)$ with respect to some observation $x$ , i.e., the information “I observe $x$ .”

E.g., the Doomsday Argument is an answer to, “How likely is the world to be such that humanity goes extinct soon, given that I observe I am the Nth of all humans born so far?” Bayesian anthropic update rules are defined by some method for computing likelihood ratios $\frac{P (I (x) | w_{1})}{P (I (x) | w_{2})}$ .^[6]

Importantly, a “world” here is specified only by its objective properties (“there are humans, at least one of whom observes he is writing a LessWrong post in February 2024 …”). We don’t specify the index of “I” (“I am this human named Anthony who was born on … [rather than someone else]”).

Why does this matter? Because, suppose you tell me everything about a world including which observer “I” am — i.e., you give me a centered world $w_{1, i}$ , which tells me the world is $w_{1}$ and I’m the ith observer in $w_{1}$ . Then it’s trivially true that $P (I (x) | w_{1, i})$ is 1 if in that world it’s true that the ith observer observes $x$ , else 0. The controversial part is how we get from $P (I (x) | w_{1, i})$ to $P (I (x) | w_{1})$ .

Let $O_{x, w}$ be the set of observers in $w$ who observe $x$ , and $O_{w}$ be the set of all observers in $w$ . (We can assume some fixed conception of “observer,” like “observer of some instantaneous experience.”) Let $n (O)$ be the number of elements in $O$ .^[7] And let $1 [s]$ equal 1 when $s$ is true, else 0. Then the main theories of interest are:

SIA: $\frac{P (I (x) | w_{1})}{P (I (x) | w_{2})} = \frac{n (O_{x, w_{1}})}{n (O_{x, w_{2}})}$

max-RC-SSA: $\frac{P (I (x) | w_{1})}{P (I (x) | w_{2})} = \frac{n (O_{x, w_{1}}) / n (O_{w_{1}})}{n (O_{x, w_{2}}) / n (O_{w_{2}})}$

min-RC-SSA: $\frac{P (I (x) | w_{1})}{P (I (x) | w_{2})} = \frac{1 [n (O_{x, w_{1}}) > 0]}{1 [n (O_{x, w_{2}}) > 0]}$

Updateful vs. updateless EDT

The anthropic update rules above are about how to form beliefs, e.g., (in the Diachronic Dutch Book setup) “How likely is it that the coin landed heads, given my observations?”

Separately, we can ask, given your beliefs, what quantity do you maximize when “maximizing expected utility”? So:

An updateful EDT agent takes the available action that maximizes ex interim expected utility, i.e., the action that’s best with respect to conditional probabilities given by updating their prior on whatever they know at the time of taking the action.
An updateless EDT agent takes the available action given by the policy that maximizes ex ante expected utility, i.e., the policy that’s best with respect to some prior.

It’s conceptually coherent, then, to not anthropically update but act according to updateful EDT. For this post, I’ll use “EDT” to mean “updateful EDT,” because if you follow updateless EDT, it doesn’t matter which anthropic update rules shape your beliefs.

The main objections to anthropically updating EDT

Diachronic Dutch Book: Consider the following setup, paraphrasing Briggs (2010):

Some scientists toss a fair coin on Sunday. They offer Beauty a bet where she wins $(15 + 2*epsilon) if heads, and loses $(15 - epsilon) if tails. Then they put her to sleep. If heads, Beauty is woken up once on Monday; if tails, she is woken up once on Monday and once on Tuesday. On each awakening, she is offered a bet where she loses $(20 - epsilon) if heads, and wins $(5 + epsilon) if tails.

Regardless of Beauty’s anthropics, the first bet is positive-EV.^[8] If Beauty anthropically updates according to SIA,^[9] and follows EDT, then she’ll also consider the second bet positive-EV.^[10]

The objection is that Beauty loses money from taking both bets, no matter whether the coin lands heads or tails (i.e., that anthropically updating EDT is Dutch-bookable).^[11]
Double-Counting: One might object to the anthropically updating EDT verdict in the above thought experiment, or some analogue like Paul Christiano’s calculator case, without invoking Dutch-bookability per se. Christiano writes (emphasis mine):

I am offered the opportunity to bet on a mathematical statement X to which I initially assign 50% probability … I have access to a calculator that is 99% reliable, i.e. it corrupts the answer 1% of the time at random. The calculator says that X is true. With what probability should I be willing to wager?

I think the answer is clearly “99%.” … Intuitively [a bet at 99.9% odds] is a very bad bet, because I “should” only have 99% confidence.

The idea is that one’s betting odds just should match the “objective probability” — and that there is no particular independent justification for having beliefs other than in setting one’s betting odds.

Pragmatism about anthropics

The following views, which together constitute what I’ll call “pragmatism about anthropics,” seem central to the objections to anthropically updating EDT. I’ll respond to the first in “Ex ante sure losses are irrelevant if you never actually occupy the ex ante perspective,” and the second in “We have reasons to have anthropic beliefs independent of decision-theoretic desiderata.”

Pragmatism: We’ll say that you “use” an anthropic update rule, at a given time, if you take the action with the highest expected utility with respect to probabilities updated based on that rule. Then:

Beliefs Should Pay Rent: You should endorse an anthropic update rule if and only if i) you “use” the update rule in this sense, and ii) the decisions induced by the update rule you use satisfy appealing decision-theoretic criteria (e.g., don’t get you Dutch booked).
No Independent Justification for Updating: If a given anthropic update rule doesn’t satisfy (i) or (ii) in some contexts, there isn’t any positive reason for endorsing it over some other update rule in other contexts.

Why I’m unconvinced by the objections to anthropically updating EDT

Since some of my counterarguments apply to both objections at once, instead of going through the objections separately, I’ll give my counterarguments and say which objections they apply to.

I’ll start by engaging with the pragmatist arguments that the consequences of combining EDT with anthropic updating are problematic, since I expect my audience won’t care about the purely epistemic arguments until after I address those consequences. (To avoid a possible misunderstanding: I’m sympathetic to only bothering with epistemic questions insofar as they seem decision-relevant. But pragmatism as defined above is considerably stronger than that, and I find it uncompelling on its face.)

Then I’ll argue that SIA / max-RC-SSA are defensible if we reject pragmatism. This is because it doesn’t make epistemic sense for my beliefs to track my normative views, and there are purely epistemic arguments in favor of SIA / max-RC-SSA.

Pragmatism isn’t well-motivated

Ex ante sure losses are irrelevant if you never actually occupy the ex ante perspective

Before responding to the pragmatist view per se, I need to explain why I don’t think an anthropically updating EDT agent actually suffers a sure loss in Diachronic Dutch Book.

By definition, an (updateful) EDT agent takes the available action that’s best in expectation ex interim, meaning, best with respect to conditional probabilities computed via their update rule. But “available” is a key word — the agent only deliberates between actions insofar as those actions are available, i.e., they actually have a decision to make. And, “actions” can include committing to policies, thereby making some actions unavailable in future decision points.

So in Diachronic Dutch Book we have one of two possibilities:

Beauty is offered the opportunity to commit to a policy of (only) accepting some subset of the bets, before the experiment begins.
Beauty accepts or rejects the first bet, then is put in the experiment, and is offered the second bet upon waking up (without having committed).

In case (1), Beauty doesn’t have anything to update on, and given her information the combination of both bets is a sure loss. So her ex interim perspective tells her to commit not to take both bets (only the first).

Importantly, then, if the objection to anthropically updating EDT is that an agent with that anthropics + decision theory will predictably get exploited, this just doesn’t hold. You might ask: Why bother endorsing an update rule if you’ll commit not to “use” it? More on this in the next subsection; but to start, in case (2) the anthropically updating EDT agent does behave differently from the non-updating agent.

In case (2), the Dutch-bookability of the joint policy of taking both bets just doesn’t imply that the individual decision to take the second bet is mistaken. Upon waking up, Beauty actually believes the tails world is likely enough that the second bet is positive-EV.^[12] Then, regardless of whether she took the first bet, I don’t see why she shouldn’t take the second. (Compare to the claim that if an agent has the opportunity to commit to a policy for Counterfactual Mugging, they should pay, but if they’re “born into” the problem, they shouldn’t.)

Counterarguments

Why might the above analysis be unsatisfactory? There are two counterarguments:

Beliefs Should Pay Rent + Dynamic Consistency:^[13] “(Beliefs Should Pay Rent) If you just commit to act in the future as if you didn’t anthropically update, you’re not really using your update rule [in the sense defined in “Pragmatism about anthropics”]. So in what sense do you even endorse it? (Dynamic Consistency) Sure, the anthropic update becomes relevant in case (2), but this is dynamically inconsistent. You should only use SIA / max-RC-SSA in case (2) if you would use it in case (1).”
1. Response: I deny that one needs to “use” an update rule in the particular sense defined above. Rather, the anthropically updating EDT agent does make use of their beliefs, insofar as they actually make decisions.
  
  Specifically: At a given time $t$ , denote my beliefs as $p_{t}$ and the action I take as $a_{t}$ . The above argument seems to assume that, for every time $t$ , if I'm an EDT agent then $a_{t}$ must maximize expected utility with respect to $p_{t}$ over all actions that would have been available to me had I not committed to some policy. Why? Because if we drop this assumption, there’s nothing inconsistent about both:
  1. “Using” the SIA / max-RC-SSA rule when I didn’t commit beforehand to a policy; and
  2. When I did commit beforehand, not “using” the SIA / max-RC-SSA rule — in the sense that the policy constrains me to an action that, had I not been under this constraint, wouldn’t have maximized expected utility.
    
    And I think we should drop this assumption, because EDT says you should take the action that maximizes expected utility (with updated beliefs) among available actions. The unavailable actions are irrelevant.
Normative Updatelessness: “Your decisions just should be ex ante optimal with respect to some prior (including, not part of a policy that is diachronically Dutch-bookable), as a bedrock principle.”
1. Response: Insofar as I have a decision to make at all when I no longer occupy the ex ante perspective — i.e., I’m not committed to a particular policy — I don’t see the motivation for deciding as if I’m still in the ex ante perspective. The counterfactual world where the coin landed otherwise than it did, which ex ante had equal weight, simply doesn’t exist.^[14]
  
  To me, maximizing expected value with respect to one’s Bayesian-updated beliefs has a strong intuitive appeal^[15] independent of Dutch book arguments. It seems that I should consider i) how likely the actual world is to be the heads-world or tails-world, and ii) what acausal influence my decision might have. And then make decisions accounting for both (i) and (ii).
  
  Of course, if the reader is just sympathetic to Normative Updatelessness at bottom, I can’t say they’re “wrong” here. But my read of the Diachronic Dutch Book argument is that it’s trying to say something less trivial than “if you endorse Normative Updatelessness, then you should not do what an updateful agent would do.”

Aside: Non-anthropically-updating EDT sometimes “fails” these cases

[This section isn’t essential to my main argument, so feel free to skip. That said, it seems important if the pragmatist argument against anthropic updating doesn’t work even on its own terms.]

Let’s grant the assumption used in the “Beliefs Should Pay Rent + Dynamic Consistency” argument above: Agents’ actions must maximize expected utility with respect to their beliefs at the time, over all possible actions (even if they were committed to some other policy). A realistic non-anthropically-updating EDT agent can still be diachronically Dutch-booked / violate ex ante optimality under plausible conditions.

If I understand correctly, the proof that EDT + min-RC-SSA is ex ante optimal (e.g., in Oesterheld and Conitzer (2024)) requires that:

Agents i) are in my exact epistemic situation if and only if ii) the actions they take are identical to mine.
I care about payoffs to agents satisfying (i)/(ii) equally to my own.

So what happens when either of these conditions is false?

First: Conitzer (2017) gives a case where agents plausibly make identical decisions without being in the exact same epistemic situation — (ii) without (i) — and shows that EDT + min-RC-SSA can be diachronically Dutch-booked in this case.^[16]

There isn’t a peer-reviewed argument providing a case of (i) without (ii) (as far as I know), but I find it plausible such cases exist. See appendix for more.

Alternatively, even if (i) and (ii) both hold, an agent might just not care about payoffs to an agent in an identical epistemic situation. Christiano acknowledges this, but doesn’t argue for why updating is bad even when the assumption of impartiality is violated:

[In this decision problem] I have impartial values. Perhaps I’m making a wager where I can either make 1 person happy or 99 people happy—I just care about the total amount of happiness, not whether I am responsible for it.

To be clear, I don’t in fact think anthropic views should be rejected based on this kind of argument (more on this in “My beliefs shouldn’t depend on my decision theory or preferences”). The point is that if we’re going to use ex ante optimality as our standard for picking anthropic beliefs, then, even holding our endorsement of EDT fixed, this standard doesn’t favor non-updating anthropics.

We have reasons to have anthropic beliefs independent of decision-theoretic desiderata

One might defend Beliefs Should Pay Rent on the grounds that, if we don’t constrain our beliefs via decision-theoretic desiderata, what other reason to have beliefs is there? This is the claim of No Independent Justification for Updating.

But it seems that beliefs are a primitive for an agent, and the most straightforward approach to navigating the world for me is to:

Systematize my degrees of confidence in hypotheses about the world (i.e., beliefs), checking that they correspond to what I actually expect upon reflection (by checking if they satisfy epistemic principles I endorse); and
Take actions that maximize expected utility with respect to my beliefs.

(We’ll see below that SIA and max-RC-SSA do plausibly satisfy some epistemic principles better than min-RC-SSA does.)

Consider whether you would endorse total epistemic nihilism if your entire life consisted of just one decision, with no opportunities for Dutch books, laws of large numbers, etc. Maybe you’d say your intuitions about such a case are unreliable because real life isn’t like that. But regardless, you don’t really escape appealing to bedrock epistemic or normative principles: In order to invoke the Diachronic Dutch Book argument, you need to assume either Dynamic Consistency or Normative Updatelessness.

Relatedly: In “EDT with updating double counts,” Christiano claims, “Other epistemological principles do help constrain the input to EDT (e.g. principles about simplicity or parsimony or whatever), but not updating.” But I don’t see the principled motivation for both a) using epistemic virtues to adjudicate between priors, yet b) ignoring epistemic virtues when adjudicating between update rules.

Without pragmatism, we have reasons to anthropically update

My beliefs shouldn’t depend on my decision theory or preferences

Diachronic Dutch Book and Double-Counting are arguments that an agent who follows both EDT and anthropic updating will do silly things. But I’m not certain of EDT (and you aren’t, either, I bet). So should I still not anthropically update?

The natural response is that insofar as I endorse EDT, I should forgo anthropic updating. (And insofar as I endorse CDT, I shouldn’t.) We might take the behavior of anthropically updating EDT in Diachronic Dutch Book, etc., as a sign that the update rule is epistemically faulty insofar as we endorse EDT.

This seems like a bizarrely ad hoc approach to forming my beliefs, though. On this approach, I should exactly adjust how much I update my beliefs (how I think the world is) to complement how decision-relevant I consider non-causal correlations (how I think I ought to act). In fact, the two objections are not just sensitive to decision-theoretic uncertainty; they also hinge on whether I’m altruistic or selfish, as we saw in “Aside: Non-anthropically-updating EDT sometimes “fails” these cases.” I can’t think of any other domain where it makes sense for my beliefs to track my normative uncertainty like this.^[17]

There are prima facie compelling epistemic arguments for SIA and max-RC-SSA

Finally, as far as we should endorse anthropic update rules on their epistemic merits, there’s a decent case for SIA or max-RC-SSA.

Others have already written at length in defense of SIA and max-RC-SSA. See, e.g., Carlsmith (2022), Bostrom (2002), and various academic references therein. But for what it’s worth, here’s my own perspective, which I haven’t seen expressed elsewhere:^[18]

I want to compute some $P (I (x) | w_{1})$ . Recall that $w_{1, i}$ means “ $w_{1}$ where I’m the ith observer,” and let $I (Ω)$ be the event that I exist at all. Then, I can break this down into $P (I (x) | w_{1}) = P (I (Ω) | w_{1}) P (I (x) | w_{1}; I (Ω))$ , which further breaks down into $P (I (x) | w_{1}) = P (I (Ω) | w_{1}) \sum_{i \in O_{w_{1}}} P (I (x) | w_{1, i}) P (w_{1, i} | w_{1}; I (Ω))$ .
As noted in “Anthropic update rules,” $P (I (x) | w_{1, i})$ is just 1 if and only if the ith observer in world $w_{1}$ observes $x$ .
So we have $P (I (x) | w_{1}) = P (I (Ω) | w_{1}) \sum_{i \in O_{x, w_{1}}} P (w_{1, i} | w_{1}; I (Ω))$ .
What is $P (w_{1, i} | w_{1}; I (Ω))$ , i.e., assuming I exist in the given world, how likely am I to be in a given index? Min-RC-SSA would say, “‘I’ am just guaranteed to be in whichever index corresponds to the person ‘I’ am.” This view has some merit (see, e.g., here and Builes (2020)). But it’s not obvious we should endorse it — I think a plausible alternative is that “I” am defined by some first-person perspective.^[19] And this perspective, absent any other information, is just as likely to be each of the indices of observers in the world. On this alternative view, $P (w_{1, i} | w_{1}; I (Ω)) = 1 / n (O_{w_{1}})$ .
Then, counting up the observers who observe $x$ , we have $\sum_{i \in O_{x, w_{1}}} P (w_{1, i} | w_{1}; I (Ω)) = n (O_{x, w_{1}}) / n (O_{w_{1}})$ .
$P (I (Ω) | w_{1})$ is a strange quantity — how do I answer “How likely was I to exist?” But there are two focal answers: We could say, “If the world had conditions conducive to my existence, I was guaranteed to exist,” i.e., $P (I (Ω) | w_{1}) = 1$ . Or, “I was more likely to exist the more observers there were in general,” i.e., $P (I (Ω) | w_{1}) \propto n (O_{w_{1}})$ . These are, respectively, how min-RC-SSA / max-RC-SSA or SIA would answer.^[20]
Therefore, depending on our answer to “How likely was I to exist?”, we get the max-RC-SSA or SIA update rule.

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Jesse Clifton, Tristan Cook, and Lukas Finnveden for very helpful discussion and comments. (This doesn’t imply they endorse my claims.) This research was conducted at the Center on Long-Term Risk and the Polaris Research Institute.

Appendix: An argument that EDT with min-RC-SSA can be ex ante suboptimal when epistemic copies aren’t decision-making copies

It seems plausible that agents in the exact same epistemic situation might make different decisions — (i) without (ii). Here, by “exact same epistemic situation,” I mean to include the following condition: the agents know they go through the exact same deliberation process before deciding whether to take a given bet.^[21]

At a high level, what’s going on is:

The diagnosis of anthropically updating EDT’s “failure” in e.g. the Briggs (2010) case is: There are N agents who are both epistemic copies and decision-making copies, and to get ex ante optimality, one should only “count” N in the expected utility of the bet once. EDT counts N at least once due to regarding itself as controlling its copies. So, ex ante optimality requires not counting N again due to the epistemic copies.
In the Conitzer (2017) case, min-RC-SSA doesn’t allow us to avoid counting N the second time, because the N agents aren’t exact epistemic copies.
In the case I’ll present, the N agents aren’t decision-making copies, so EDT will count only a fraction of N. But if we adopt min-RC-SSA^[22] in at attempt to avoid counting N due to the epistemic copies, in total we’ll count only a fraction of N. (In other words, if you decide not to update in order to avoid “double-counting,” you will fail to single-count when your acausal influence is too weak.)

Consider Carlsmith’s God’s coin toss with equal numbers. We can turn this case into a bet as follows:

You close your eyes and enter a room with 9 other people. God chooses a number R from 1 to 10, uniformly at random. Then God flips a coin, and if heads, puts a red jacket on the Rth person, otherwise puts a red jacket on all 10 people. God offers each red-jacketed person a deal where they get $(1 + C) if the coin flip was heads, and pay $1 if tails.
You see that you have a red jacket (but don’t see the other 9 people, who are hidden in cubicles). You know that each of the other people goes through the same thought process as you, such that:
the epistemic state of any of those people would be identical to yours conditional on being assigned a red jacket, and
they have the same thoughts about the value of different allocations of money.
Do you accept the deal?

Here’s how I think an EDT + min-RC-SSA agent would reason:

“‘I’ either am the person / observer-moment in the index R, or not. There’s no sense in which ‘I’ had my index randomly assigned. Or put differently, I don’t learn anything from the fact that ‘I’ have a red jacket and therefore must be in index R conditional on heads; after all, someone was going to be in that index. So I don’t update on having the red jacket.
“Now, supposing the coin landed tails, the other people would be in the same epistemic situation as me. But:
- “First, this doesn’t mean I should be certain they’ll make the same decision. Our decisions seem strongly correlated, but their decision might be affected by unconscious factors on which we differ. So even if I care about their payoffs, if C is sufficiently large, I should take the bet.
- “Second, do I even care about their payoffs? Maybe not — even though they’re thinking the exact same thing, this doesn’t mean our values are identical, because our values can be indexical / selfish.”

But for C < 9, the ex ante utility, from the perspective of before the coin flip, is negative.^[23]

^{^}
Or other alternatives to causal decision theory (CDT), but I’ll just consider EDT here because it’s the most well-defined alternative, and consequently I’m not sure which other decision theories this post is relevant to.
^{^}
But all the results should hold for other non-minimal reference classes.
^{^}
This isn’t maximally precise — minimal-reference-class SSA does also “update” in the weak sense of ruling out worlds where no observers in one’s epistemic situation exist. But in practice the implications of minimal-reference-class SSA and strictly non-updating anthropics seem very similar.
^{^}
Another category of objection is that anthropically updating EDT can endorse “managing the anthropic news.” See, e.g., “The Anthropic Trilemma.” I think this behavior is indeed pretty counterintuitive, but I don’t see a sense in which it poses a qualitatively different challenge to anthropically updating EDT than the other objections do, so I’ll leave it out of this post. (Indeed, this case seems structurally similar to non-anthropic counterexamples to EDT, like Smoking Lesion and XOR Blackmail. But biting these bullets definitely has precedent, and for good reason in my opinion. For example, in XOR Blackmail, given that you’ve received the letter from a perfect predictor, it is just logically impossible for it to be the case that you find that the disastrous outcome didn’t occur if you don’t pay. Committing not to pay ahead of time is, of course, an option available to EDT agents.)
The main element that “managing the anthropic news” adds is that it seems to have a wacky practical implication. Briefly, I don’t think this distinction matters because I’m skeptical that my endorsement of normative principles should depend on whether the counterintuitive implications are particularly realistic; how realistic the implications are seems pretty contingent.
^{^}
See also Armstrong (2017).
^{^}
Why isn’t there an obvious, uncontroversial way of computing these likelihood ratios? Because there isn’t an obvious, uncontroversial way of interpreting the evidence, “I observe x.” See “There are prima facie compelling epistemic arguments for SIA and max-RC-SSA” for more.
^{^}
Technically, we’d need some measure m such that, first, m(O) = n(O) if O is finite, and second, we get sensible ratios of measures m(O1) / m(O2) even when at least one of O1 and O2 is infinite. Similarly, for completeness, we’d want to define the likelihood ratios in a sensible way whenever we would’ve otherwise divided by zero. But neither of these are important for the purposes of this post.
^{^}
Specifically, 1/2 · (15 + 2*epsilon) - 1/2 · (15 - epsilon) = 3/2*epsilon.
^{^}
With a different setup, one can provide an analogous Dutch book for max-RC-SSA (see Sec. 5.5 of Oesterheld and Conitzer (2024)).
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Specifically, 1/3 · (-20 + epsilon) + 2/3 · 2 · (5 + epsilon) = 5/3*epsilon. (Because she follows EDT, her calculation doubles the winnings conditional on tails (5 + epsilon), since she knows her Tuesday-self takes the bet if and only if her Monday-self does.)
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If heads, she nets $(15 + 2*epsilon - 20 + epsilon) < 0, and if tails, she nets $(-15 + epsilon + 10 + 2*epsilon) < 0.
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You might object that she doesn’t have reason to believe the tails world is more likely in the first place. But again, that requires a separate argument; it’s not about the failure of anthropic updating with EDT.
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Thanks to Jesse Clifton for helping formulate this version of the counterargument (which he doesn’t endorse).
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So, e.g., I don’t see the motivation for just thinking of updating as counting the number of “instances of me” across the worlds in my prior. C.f. Fallenstein’s “Self-modification is the correct justification for updateless decision theory.” (I’m not saying that Fallenstein currently endorses my claim.)
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I agree with Tomasik here: “At this point, I would be willing simply to accept the expected-value criterion as an axiomatic intuition: The potential good accomplished by [the higher-EV option in a one-off decision, where the law of large numbers doesn’t apply] is just so great that a chance for it shouldn't be forgone.” See also Joe Carlsmith’s article on maximizing EV.
This is not to say Bayesianism applies everywhere — I just don’t see a particular reason conditionalization should break here, when forming likelihoods P(I(x) | w).
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The basic idea is that the decision points might be not exactly the same, yet only differ with respect to irrelevant information, such that the decision points involve “symmetric” information.
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See also Carlsmith’s “An aside on betting in anthropics”, especially this quote: “Indeed, I’ve been a bit surprised by the extent to which some people writing about anthropics seem interested in adjusting (contorting?) their epistemology per se in order to bet a particular way — instead of just, you know, betting that way. This seems especially salient to me in the context of discussions about dynamical inconsistencies between the policy you’d want to adopt ex ante, and your behavior ex post … As I discussed in my last post, these cases are common outside of anthropics, too, and “believe whatever you have to in order to do the right thing” doesn’t seem the most immediately attractive solution.” (I’m not sure if he would endorse my defense of betting ex ante suboptimally when you’re not in the ex ante perspective, though.)
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Credit to Jesse Clifton for proposing a similar approach to foundationalist reasoning about anthropic update rules (as opposed to relying on intuitions about specific thought experiments); he doesn’t necessarily endorse the approach I give here.
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I.e., the perspective from which, in this moment, I have my experiences but I don't have anyone else's.
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As an aside, this structure of argument resembles the “R-SIA + SSA” view discussed by Carlsmith — contra Carlsmith, personally I find this argument more principled than the “simpler” justification for SIA, and from this perspective max-RC-SSA seems somewhat more compelling overall than SIA.
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Thanks to Lukas Finnveden for emphasizing the relevance of this assumption.
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(Or, indeed, if we avoid even the very modest update that min-RC-SSA makes.)
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I.e., 0.5*0.1*(1 + C) - 0.5*1 < 0.