The Emulation argument for human-level AI argues that since whole brain emulation seems feasible then human-level AI must also be feasible. There are many underlying assumptions in the argument, most of them are explored by Chalmers (2010)¹. Perhaps the most debated premise is holding that a brain emulation could have a consciousness mind or that consciousness isn’t fundamental to human intelligence. Chalmers ² formalized the argument as follows:”

(i) The human brain is a machine.
(ii) We will have the capacity to emulate this machine (before long).
(iii) If we emulate this machine, there will be AI.
(iv) Absent defeaters, there will be AI (before long)”

References

CHALMERS, David. (2010) "The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis, Journal of Consciousness Studies", 17 (9-10), pp. 7-65.↩