The weak Gödel's first incompleteness theorem states that every -consistent axiomatizable extension of minimal arithmetic is incomplete.
Let extend minimal_arithmetic, and let be the standard provability predicate of .
Then we apply the diagonal lemma to get such that .
We assert that the sentence is undecidable in . We prove it by contradiction:
Suppose that . Then is correct, and as it is a -rudimentary sentence then it is provable in minimal arithmetic, and thus in . So we have that and also by the construction of that , contradicting that is consistent.
Now, suppose that . Then . But then as is consistent there cannot be a standard proof of , so if is of the form then for no natural number it can be that , so is -inconsistent, in contradiction with the hypothesis.
Every consistent and axiomatizable extension of minimal_arithmetic is incomplete.
This theorem follows as a consequence of the undecidability of arithmetic combined with the lemma stating that any complete axiomatizable theory is undecidable