This post is part of the sequence version of the Effective Altruism Foundation's research agenda on Cooperation, Conflict, and Transformative Artificial Intelligence.


As noted in the document, several sections of this agenda drew on writings by Lukas Gloor, Daniel Kokotajlo, Anni Leskelä, Caspar Oesterheld, and Johannes Treutlein. Thank you very much to David Althaus, Tobias Baumann, Alexis Carlier, Alex Cloud, Max Daniel, Michael Dennis, Lukas Gloor, Adrian Hutter, Daniel Kokotajlo, János Kramár, David Krueger, Anni Leskelä, Matthijs Maas, Linh Chi Nguyen, Richard Ngo, Caspar Oesterheld, Mahendra Prasad, Rohin Shah, Carl Shulman, Stefan Torges, Johannes Treutlein, and Jonas Vollmer for comments on drafts of this document. Thank you also to the participants of the Effective Altruism Foundation research retreat and workshops, whose contributions also helped to shape this agenda.


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