Evan Hubinger

I (Evan Hubinger) am a safety researcher at Anthropic. My posts and comments are my own and do not represent Anthropic's positions, policies, strategies, or opinions. Previously: MIRI, OpenAI.

See: “Why I'm joining Anthropic

Pronouns: he/him/his

Email: evanjhub@gmail.com

Selected work:

Sequences

Conditioning Predictive Models
ML Alignment Theory Scholars Program Winter 2021
Risks from Learned Optimization

Wiki Contributions

Comments

Another thought here:

  • If we're in a slow enough takeoff world, maybe it's fine to just have the understanding standard here be post-hoc, where labs are required to be able to explain why a failure occurred after it has already occurred. Obviously, at some point I expect us to have to deal with situations where some failures could be unrecoverable, but the hope here would be that if you can demonstrate a level of understanding that has been sufficient to explain exactly why all previous failures occurred, that's a pretty high bar, and it could plausibly be a high enough bar to prevent future catastrophic failures.

Yep, seems too expensive to do literally as stated, but right now I'm just searching for anything concrete that would fit the bill, regardless of how practical it would be to actually run. If we decided that this was what we needed, I bet we could find a good approximation, though I don't have one right now.

And I'm not exactly sure what part of the solution this would fill—it's not clear to me whether this alone would be either sufficient or necessary. But it does feel like it gives you real evidence about the degree of understanding that you have, so it feels like it could be a part of a solution somewhere.

Thanks to Chris Olah for a helpful conversation here.

Some more thoughts on this:

  • One thing that seems pretty important here is to have your evaluation based around worst-case rather than average-case guarantees, and not tied to any particular narrow distribution. If your mechanism for judging understanding is based on an average-case guarantee over a narrow distribution, then you're sort of still in the same boat as you started with behavioral evaluations, since it's not clear why understanding that passes such an evaluation would actually help you deal with worst-case failures in the real world. This is highly related to my discussion of best-case vs. worst-case transparency here.
  • Another thing worth pointing out here regarding using causal scrubbing for something like this is that causal scrubbing requires some base distribution that you're evaluating over, which means it could fall into a similar sort of trap to that in the first bullet point here. Presumably, if you wanted to build a causal-scrubbing-based safety evaluation, you'd just use the entire training distribution as the distribution you were evaluating over, which seems like it would help a lot with this problem, but it's still not completely clear that it would solve it, especially if you were just evaluating your average-case causal scrubbing loss over that distribution.

Here's another idea that is not quite there but could be a component of a solution here:

  • If a red-team finds some particular model failure (or even some particular benign model behavior), can you fix (or change/remove) that behavior exclusively by removing training data rather than adding it? Certainly I expect it to be possible to fix specific failures by fine-tuning on them, but if you can demonstrate that you can fix failures just by removing existing data, that demonstrates something meaningful about your ability to understand what your model is learning from each data point that it sees.

It seems like all the safety strategies are targeted at outer alignment and interpretability.

None of the recent OpenAI, Deepmind, Anthropic, or Conjecture plans seem to target inner alignment

???


Less tongue-in-cheek: certainly it's unclear to what extent interpretability will be sufficient for addressing various forms of inner alignment failures, but I definitely think interpretability research should count as inner alignment research.

Listening to this John Oliver, I feel like getting broad support behind transparency-based safety standards might be more possible than I previously thought. He emphasizes the "if models are doing some bad behavior, the creators should be able to tell us why" point a bunch and it's in fact a super reasonable point. It seems to me like we really might be able to get enough broad consensus on that sort of a point to get labs to agree to some sort of standard based on it.

Here's a particularly nice concrete example of the first thing here that you can test concretely right now (thanks to (edit: Jacob Pfau and) Ethan Perez for this example): give a model a prompt full of examples of it acting poorly. An agent shouldn't care and should still act well regardless of whether it's previously acted poorly, but a predictor should reason that probably the examples of it acting poorly mean it's predicting a bad agent, so it should continue to act poorly.

One way to think about what's happening here, using a more predictive-models-style lens: the first-order effect of updating the model's prior on "looks helpful" is going to give you a more helpful posterior, but it's also going to upweight whatever weird harmful things actually look harmless a bunch of the time, e.g. a Waluigi.

Put another way: once you've asked for helpfulness, the only hypotheses left are those that are consistent with previously being helpful, which means when you do get harmfulness, it'll be weird. And while the sort of weirdness you get from a Waluigi doesn't seem itself existentially dangerous, there are other weird hypotheses that are consistent with previously being helpful that could be existentially dangerous, such as the hypothesis that it should be predicting a deceptively aligned AI.

(Moderation note: moved to the Alignment Forum from LessWrong.)

(Moderation note: added to the Alignment Forum from LessWrong.)

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