I've been gingerly building my way up toward similar ideas but I haven't yet posted my thoughts on the subject. I appreciate you ripping the band-aid off.
There are two obvious ways an intelligence can be non-consequentialist.
If you define intelligence to be consequentialist then corrigibility becomes extremely difficult for the reasons Eliezer Yudkowsky has expounded ad nauseum. If you create a non-consequentialist intelligence then corrigibility is almost the default—especially with regard to stateless intelligences.... (read more)
Much of the dialogue about AI Safety I encounter in off-the-record conversations seems to me like it's not grounded in reality. I repeatedly hear (what I feel to be) a set of shaky arguments that both shut down conversation and are difficult to validate empirically.
The shaky argument is as follows:
I am not saying this line of reasoning is what AI researchers... (read more)
I came to this book with an ax to grind. I combed through page after page for factual errors, minor misrepresentations or even just contestable opinions. I spotted (what seemed like) omission after omission only to be frustrated just a few pages later when Brian Christian addressed them. In the Chapter 5: Shaping I thought I found a major mistake. Brian Christian addressed Skinnerian operant conditioning without addressing the real way we manages human groups: leading by example.
That's because he dedicated all of Chapter 7: Imitation to the subject. Thus, through gritted teeth, I reluctantly acknowledge that The Alignment Problem by Brian Christian is a fantastic book in all respects.
Despite my best... (read 1760 more words →)
Am I still eligible for the prize if I publish a public blog post at the same time I submit the Google Doc or would you prefer I not publish a blog post about February 15th? Publishing the blog post immediately advances science better (because it can enable discussion) but waiting until after the February 15th might be preferable to you for contest-related reasons.