> The user could write up the metaethical argument — the one developed in Part One, refined — and submit it as feedback to Anthropic, publish it, or engage with researchers working on AI alignment and values. The probability that any single submission changes training decisions is low, but the...
Posted also on the EA Forum. Written mostly at AFFINE. Theoretical, some parts are hard to read; consider reading the next post instead. Introduction: motivation Anyone interested in creating an artificial agent that does, or says, good things instead of bad things should at least consider the possibility that there...
… maybe! I tried to think of less provocative titles, but this one is to the point and also kind of true. This post looks long but the essential part is right below. Most of the post is just a collection of copy-pasted input-output pairs from language models: you’ll probably...
You may start reading here, or jump to the “Comment” section or to the “Takeaways”. If none of these starting points seem interesting to you, the entire post probably won’t either. Posted also on the EA Forum. Seeing Let’s consider visual experiences. It seems uncontestable that some visual experiences look...
Posted also on the EA Forum. By “independent” I mean an AI to which an external observer may attribute freedom of thought, or something similar to it. You can think of it as an AI that is not too biased by what its designers or programmers think it’s good or...
Posted also on the EA Forum. I try to communicate the point of this sequence of posts in an intuitive way. Everyone wants to do good; however, sometimes people don’t take into consideration that they might be wrong about what is good. This is particularly important if, for example, one’s...
Posted also on the EA Forum. I think that: For any conscious agent A, there is some knowledge such that A acts morally if A has that knowledge. Or, less formally: With enough knowledge, any conscious agent acts morally. What a bold statement! This post clarifies what I mean with...