I want everyone to be able to achieve world they would really like; guess the best way to do that is to help people learn, build one's strengths, build small-scale and large-scale projects, and also to cooperate.
Any gift must be accepted with gratitude and, if possible, with grace.
As of 2024-12-21, I have signed no contracts I cannot mention exist. I finally got to adding this notice thanks to the one in the-gears-to-ascension's bio.
We want to be able to point at Elsa’s case of value change and argue that it is problematic and should be prevented, and we want to be able to say that Daniel’s case of value change is fine and does not need to be prevented, without in either case basing our argumentation on whether or not loving jazz is a morally acceptable or not. As such, I argue that the relevant difference we are picking up on here pertains to the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of the value change process (in the sense I've described it above).
Is it really the relevant difference?
I think that there could be cases of acceptable illegitimate value change; that is, if both current I and I-as-in-CEV (in the future, knowing more, etc) would endorse the change, but it were done without a way to course-correct it. Metaphor: imagine you had to walk over a hanging bridge so that you couldn't stop in the middle at risk of injury.
So, in my opinion legitimacy can be based on nature of value change only, but acceptability is also based on the opinion of person in question.
It would also be interesting to investigate which of those protocols are guaranteed to eventually halt on all inputs.
I can see that in last protocol (relativized for RE) a malicious prover can prevent verifier from ever terminating, if the verifier is required to accept all valid move sequences / pointers / ... however long they might be. (That is a mathematical theorem and not fixed by choosing a clever encoding for numbers of arbitrary length.)