Former AI safety research engineer, now AI governance researcher at OpenAI. Blog: thinkingcomplete.com
Forgot to reply to this at the time, but I think this is a pretty good ITT. (I think there's probably some additional argument that people would make about why this isn't just an isolated analogy, but rather a more generally-applicable argument, but it does seem to be a fairly central example of that generally-applicable argument.)
Why not? It seems like this is a good description of how values change for humans under self-reflection; why not for AIs?
I'd classify them as values insofar as people care about them intrinsically.
Then they might also be strategies, insofar as people also care about them instrumentally.
I guess I should get rid of the "only" in the sentence you quoted? But I do want to convey "something which is only a strategy, not a goal or value, doesn't have any intrinsic value". Will think about phrasing.
It's not actually the case that the derivation of a higher abstraction level always changes our lower-level representation. Again, consider people -> social groups -> countries. Our models of specific people we know, how we relate to them, etc., don't change just because we've figured out a way to efficiently reason about entire groups of people at once. We can now make better predictions about the world, yes, we can track the impact of more-distant factors on our friends, but we don't actually start to care about our friends in a different way in the light of all this.
I actually think this type of change is very common—because individuals' identities are very strongly interwoven with the identities of the groups they belong to. You grow up as a kid and even if you nominally belong to a given (class/political/religious) group, you don't really understand it very well. But then over time you construct your identity as X type of person, and that heavily informs your friendships—they're far less likely to last when they have to bridge very different political/religious/class identities. E.g. how many college students with strong political beliefs would say that it hasn't impacted the way they feel about friends with opposing political beliefs?
Inasmuch as real-life deontologists don't actually shut down when facing a values conflict. They ultimately pick one or the other, in a show of revealed preferences.I model this just as an agent having two utility functions, u1 and u2, and optimizing for their sum u1+u2.
Inasmuch as real-life deontologists don't actually shut down when facing a values conflict. They ultimately pick one or the other, in a show of revealed preferences.
I model this just as an agent having two utility functions, u1 and u2, and optimizing for their sum u1+u2.
This is a straightforwardly incorrect model of deontologists; the whole point of deontology is rejecting the utility-maximization framework. Instead, deontologists have a bunch of rules and heuristics (like "don't kill"). But those rules and heuristics are underdefined in the sense that they often endorse different lines of reasoning which give different answers. For example, they'll say pulling the lever in a trolley problem is right, but pushing someone onto the tracks is wrong, but also there's no moral difference between doing something via a lever or via your own hands.
I guess technically you could say that the procedure for resolving this is "do a bunch of moral philosophy" but that's basically equivalent to "do a bunch of systematization".
Suppose we've magically created an agent that already starts our with a perfect world-model. It'll never experience an ontology crisis in its life. This agent would still engage in value translation as I'd outlined....But optimizing for all humans' welfare would still remain an instrumental goal for it, wholly subordinate to its love for the two specific humans.
Suppose we've magically created an agent that already starts our with a perfect world-model. It'll never experience an ontology crisis in its life. This agent would still engage in value translation as I'd outlined.
But optimizing for all humans' welfare would still remain an instrumental goal for it, wholly subordinate to its love for the two specific humans.
Yeah, I totally agree with this. The question is then: why don't translated human goals remain instrumental? It seems like your answer is basically just that it's a design flaw in the human brain, of allowing value drift; the same type of thing which could in principle happen in an agent with a perfect world-model. And I agree that this is probably part of the effect. But it seems to me that, given that humans don't have perfect world-models, the explanation I've given (that systematization makes our values better-defined) is more likely to be the dominant force here.
I agree that this is closely related to the predictive processing view of the brain. In the post I briefly distinguish between "low-level systematization" and "high-level systematization"; I'd call the thing you're describing the former. Whereas the latter seems like it might be more complicated, and rely on whatever machinery brains have on top of the predictive coding (e.g. abstract reasoning, etc).
In particular, some humans are way more systematizing than others (even at comparable levels of intelligence). And so just saying "humans are constantly doing this" feels like it's missing something important. Whatever the thing is that some humans are doing way more of than others, that's what I'm calling high-level systematizing.
Re self-unalignment: that framing feels a bit too abstract for me; I don't really know what it would mean, concretely, to be "self-aligned". I do know what it would mean for a human to systematize their values—but as I argue above, it's neither desirable to fully systematize them nor to fully conserve them. Identifying whether there's a "correct" amount of systematization to do feels like it will require a theory of cognition and morality that we don't yet have.
Thanks for the comment! I agree that thinking of minds as hierarchically modeling the world is very closely related to value systematization.
But I think the mistake you're making is to assume that the lower levels are preserved after finding higher-level abstractions. Instead, higher-level abstractions reframe the way we think about lower-level abstractions, which can potentially change them dramatically. This is what happens with most scientific breakthroughs: we start with lower-level phenomena, but we don't understand them very well until we discover the higher-level abstraction.
For example, before Darwin people had some concept that organisms seemed to be "well-fitted" for their environments, but it was a messy concept entangled with their theological beliefs. After Darwin, their concept of fitness changed. It's not that they've drifted into using the new concept, it's that they've realized that the old concept was under-specified and didn't really make sense.
Similarly, suppose you have two deontological values which trade off against each other. Before systematization, the question of "what's the right way to handle cases where they conflict" is not really well-defined; you have no procedure for doing so. After systematization, you do. (And you also have answers to questions like "what counts as lying?" or "is X racist?", which without systematization are often underdefined.)
That's where the tradeoff comes from. You can conserve your values (i.e. continue to care terminally about lower-level representations) but the price you pay is that they make less sense, and they're underdefined in a lot of cases. Or you can simplify your values (i.e. care terminally about higher-level representations) but the price you pay is that the lower-level representations might change a lot.
And that's why the "mind itself wants to do this" does make sense, because it's reasonable to assume that highly capable cognitive architectures will have ways of identifying aspects of their thinking that "don't make sense" and correcting them.
I'm very sympathetic to this complaint; I think that these arguments simply haven't been made rigorously, and at this point it seems like Nate and Eliezer are not in an epistemic position where they're capable of even trying to do so. (That is, they reject the conception of "rigorous" that you and I are using in these comments, and therefore aren't willing to formulate their arguments in a way which moves closer to meeting it.)
You should look at my recent post on value systematization, which is intended as a framework in which these claims can be discussed more clearly.
FWIW I think that gradient hacking is pretty plausible, but it'll probably end up looking fairly "prosaic", and may not be a problem even if it's present.
How do you feel about "In an ideal world, we'd stop all AI progress"? Or "ideally, we'd stop all AI progress"?
FWIW I think some of the thinking I've been doing about meta-rationality and ontological shifts feels like metaphilosophy. Would be happy to call and chat about it sometime.
I do feel pretty wary about reifying the label "metaphilosophy" though. My preference is to start with a set of interesting questions which we can maybe later cluster into a natural category, rather than starting with the abstract category and trying to populate it with questions (which feels more like what you're doing, although I could be wrong).