Research Scientist at DeepMind. Creator of the Alignment Newsletter. http://rohinshah.com/
I feel like a lot of these arguments could be pretty easily made of individual AI safety researchers. E.g.
Misaligned IncentivesIn much the same way that AI systems may have perverse incentives, so do the [AI safety researchers]. They are [humans]. They need to make money, [feed themselves, and attract partners]. [Redacted and redacted even just got married.] This type of accountability to personal interests is not perfectly in line with doing what is good for human interests. Moreover, [AI safety researchers are often] technocrats whose values and demographics do not represent humanity particularly well. Optimizing for the goals that the [AI safety researchers] have is not the same thing as optimizing for human welfare. Goodhart’s Law applies.
In much the same way that AI systems may have perverse incentives, so do the [AI safety researchers]. They are [humans]. They need to make money, [feed themselves, and attract partners]. [Redacted and redacted even just got married.] This type of accountability to personal interests is not perfectly in line with doing what is good for human interests. Moreover, [AI safety researchers are often] technocrats whose values and demographics do not represent humanity particularly well. Optimizing for the goals that the [AI safety researchers] have is not the same thing as optimizing for human welfare. Goodhart’s Law applies.
I feel pretty similarly about most of the other arguments in this post.
Tbc I think there are plenty of things one could reasonably critique scaling labs about, I just think the argumentation in this post is by and large off the mark, and implies a standard that if actually taken literally would be a similarly damning critique of the alignment community.
(Conflict of interest notice: I work at Google DeepMind.)
Sounds reasonable, though idk what you think realistic values of N are (my wild guess with hardly any thought is 15 minutes - 1 day).
EDIT: Tbc in the 1 day case I'm imagining that most of the time goes towards running the experiment -- it's more a claim about what experiments we want to run. If we just talk about the time to write the code and launch the experiment I'm thinking of N in the range of 5 minutes to 1 hour.
Cool, that all roughly makes sense to me :)
I was certainly imagining at least some amount of multi-tasking (e.g. 4 projects at once each of which runs 8x faster). This doesn't feel that crazy to me, I already do a moderate amount of multi-tasking.
Multi-tasking where you are responsible for the entire design of the project? (Designing the algorithm, choosing an experimental setting and associated metrics, knowing the related work, interpreting the results of the experiments, figuring out what the next experiment should be, ...)
Suppose today I gave you a device where you put in moderately detailed instructions for experiments, and the device returns the results with N minutes of latency and infinite throughput. Do you think you can spend 1 working day using this device to produce the same output as 4 copies of yourself working in parallel for a week (and continue to do that for months, after you've exhausted low-hanging fruit)?
... Having written this hypothetical out, I am finding it more plausible than before, at least for small enough N, though it still feels quite hard at e.g. N = 60.
The experiments can't use too much compute. No solving the halting problem.
I agree it helps to run experiments at small scales first, but I'd be pretty surprised if that helped to the point of enabling a 30x speedup -- that means that the AI labor allows you get 30x improvement in compute needed beyond what would be done by default by humans (though the 30x can include e.g. improving utilization, it's not limited just to making individual experiments take less time).
I think the most plausible case for your position would be that the compute costs for ML research scale much less than quadratically with the size of the pretrained model, e.g. maybe (1) finetuning starts taking fewer data points as model size increases (sample efficiency improves with model capability), and so finetuning runs become a rounding error on compute, and (2) the vast majority of ML research progress involves nothing more expensive than finetuning runs. (Though in this world you have to wonder why we keep training bigger models instead of just investing solely in better finetuning the current biggest model.)
Another thing that occurred to me is that latency starts looking like another major bottleneck. Currently it seems feasible to make a paper's worth of progress in ~6 months. With a 30x speedup, you now have to do that in 6 days. At that scale, introducing additional latency via experiments at small scales is a huge cost.
(I'm assuming here that the ideas and overall workflow are still managed by human researchers, since your hypothetical said that the AIs are just going from high level ideas to implemented experiments. If you have fully automated AI researchers then they don't need to optimize latency as hard; they can instead get 30x speedup by having 30x as many researchers working but still producing a paper every 6 months.)
(Another possibility is that human ML researchers get really good at multi-tasking, and so e.g. they have 5 paper-equivalents at any given time, each of which takes 30 calendar days to complete. But I don't believe that (most) human ML researchers are that good at multitasking on research ideas, and there isn't that much time for them to learn.)
It also seems hard for the human researchers to have ideas good enough to turn into paper-equivalents every 6 days. Also hard for those researchers to keep on top of the literature well enough to be proposing stuff that actually makes progress rather than duplicating existing work they weren't aware of, even given AI tools that help with understanding the literature.
Further, the current scaling laws imply huge inference availablity if huge amounts of compute are used for training.
Tbc the fact that running your automated ML implementers takes compute was a side point; I'd be making the same claims even if running the AIs was magically free.
Though even at a billion token-equivalents per second it seems plausible to me that your automated ML experiment implementers end up being a significant fraction of that compute. It depends quite significantly on how capable a single forward pass is, e.g. can the AI just generate an entire human-level pull request autoregressively (i.e. producing each token of the PR one at a time, without going back to fix errors) vs does it do similar things as humans (write tests and code, test, debug, eventually submit) vs. does it do way more iteration and error correction than humans (in parallel to avoid crazy high latency), do we use best-of-N sampling or similar tricks to improve quality of generations, etc.
I think ML research in particular can plausibly be accelerated by maybe 30x by only making it extremely fast and cheap to go from high level ideas to implemented experiments (rather than needing to generate these high level ideas)
Why doesn't compute become the bottleneck well before the 30x mark? It seems like the AIs have to be superhuman at something to overcome that bottleneck (rather than just making it fast and cheap to implement experiments). Indeed the AIs make the problem somewhat worse, since you have to spend compute to run the AIs.
I think you mostly need to hope that it doesn't matter (because the crazy XOR directions aren't too salient) or come up with some new idea.
Yeah certainly I'd expect the crazy XOR directions aren't too salient.
I'll note that if it ends up these XOR directions don't matter for generalization in practice, then I start to feel better about CCS (along with other linear probing techniques). I know that for CCS you're more worried about issues around correlations with features like true_according_to_Alice, but my feeling is that we might be able to handle spurious features that are that crazy and numerous, but not spurious features as crazy and numerous as these XORs.
Imo "true according to Alice" is nowhere near as "crazy" a feature as "has_true XOR has_banana". It seems useful for the LLM to model what is true according to Alice! (Possibly I'm misunderstanding what you mean by "crazy" here.)
I'm not against linear probing techniques in general. I like linear probes, they seem like a very useful tool. I also like contrast pairs. But I would basically always use these techniques in a supervised way, because I don't see a great reason to expect unsupervised methods to work better.
If I had to articulate my reason for being surprised here, it'd be something like:I didn't expect LLMs to compute many XORs incidentallyI didn't expect LLMs to compute many XORs because they are usefulbut lots of XORs seem to get computed anyway.
If I had to articulate my reason for being surprised here, it'd be something like:
but lots of XORs seem to get computed anyway.
This is reasonable. My disagreement is mostly that I think LLMs are complicated things and do lots of incidental stuff we don't yet understand. So I shouldn't feel too surprised by any given observation that could be explained by an incidental hypothesis. But idk it doesn't seem like an important point.
Yeah, agreed that's a clear overclaim.
In general I believe that many (most?) people take it too far and make incorrect inferences -- partly on priors about popular posts, and partly because many people including you believe this, and those people engage more with the Simulators crowd than I do.
Fwiw I was sympathetic to nostalgebraist's positive review saying:
sometimes putting a name to what you "already know" makes a whole world of difference. [...] I see these takes, and I uniformly respond with some version of the sentiment "it seems like you aren't thinking of GPT as a simulator!"
I think in all three of the linked cases I broadly directionally agreed with nostalgebraist, and thought that the Simulator framing was at least somewhat helpful in conveying the point. The first one didn't seem that important (it was critiquing imo a relatively minor point), but the second and third seemed pretty direct rebuttals of popular-ish views. (Note I didn't agree with all of what was said, e.g. nostalgebraist doesn't seem at all worried about a base GPT-1000 model, whereas I would put some probability on doom for malign-prior reasons. But this feels more like "reasonable disagreement" than "wildly misled by simulator framing".)
Yeah, I would be surprised if this is a good first-order approximation of what is going on inside an LLM. Or maybe you mean this in a non-mechanistic way?
Yes, I definitely meant this in the non-mechanistic way. Any mechanistic claims that sound simulator-flavored based just on the evidence in this post sounds clearly overconfident and probably wrong. I didn't reread this post carefully but I don't remember seeing mechanistic claims in it.
I agree that in a non-mechanistic way, the above will produce reasonable predictions, but that's because that's basically a description of the task the LLM is trained on. [...]
I mostly agree and this is an aspect of what I mean by "this post says obvious and uncontroversial things". I'm not particularly advocating for this post in the review; I didn't find it especially illuminating.
To give a concrete counterexample to the algorithm you propose for predicting what an LLM does next. Current LLMs have a broader knowledge base than any human alive. This means the algorithm of "figure out what real-world process would produce text like this" can't be accurate
This seems somewhat in conflict with the previous quote?
Re: the concrete counterexample, yes I am in fact only making claims about base models; I agree it doesn't work for RLHF'd models. Idk how you want to weigh the fact that this post basically just talks about base models in your review, I don't have a strong opinion there.
I think it is in fact hard to get a base model to combine pieces of knowledge that tend not to be produced by any given human (e.g. writing an epistemically sound rap on the benefits of blood donation), and that often the strategy to get base models to do things like this is to write a prompt that makes it seem like we're in the rare setting where text is being produced by an entity with those abilities.
The thing that's confusing here is that the two-way XORs that my experiments are looking at just seem clearly not useful for anything.
Idk, I think it's pretty hard to know what things are and aren't useful for predicting the next token. For example, some of your features involve XORing with a "has_not" feature -- XORing with an indicator for "not" might be exactly what you want to do to capture the effect of the "not".
(Tbc here the hypothesis could be "the model computes XORs with has_not all the time, and then uses only some of them", so it does have some aspect of "compute lots of XORs", but it is still a hypothesis that clearly by default doesn't produce multiway XORs.)
In contrast, the point I'm trying to make in the post is that RAX can cause problems even in the absence of spurious correlations like this.^If you want you could rephrase this issue as "a and a⊕b are spuriously correlated in training," so I guess I should say "even in the absence of spurious correlations among basic features."
In contrast, the point I'm trying to make in the post is that RAX can cause problems even in the absence of spurious correlations like this.
If you want you could rephrase this issue as "a and a⊕b are spuriously correlated in training," so I guess I should say "even in the absence of spurious correlations among basic features."
... That's exactly how I would rephrase the issue and I'm not clear on why you're making a sharp distinction here.
As you noted, it will sometimes be the case that XOR features are more like basic features than derived features, and thus will be represented with high salience. I think incidental hypotheses will have a really hard time explaining this -- do you agree?
I mean, I'd say the ones that are more like basic features are like that because it was useful, and it's all the other XORs that are explained by incidental hypotheses. The incidental hypotheses shouldn't be taken to be saying that all XORs are incidental, just the ones which aren't explained by utility. Perhaps a different way of putting it is that I expect both utility and incidental hypotheses to be true to some extent.
Maybe on your model this is something simple like the weights computing the basic features being larger than weights computing derived features? If so, that's the tracking I'm talking about, and is a potential thread to pull on for distinguishing basic vs. derived features using model internals.
Yes, on my model it could be something like the weights for basic features being large. It's not necessarily that simple, e.g. it could also be that the derived features are in superposition with a larger number of other features that leads to more interference. If you're calling that "tracking", fair enough I guess; my main claim is that it shouldn't be surprising. I agree it's a potential thread for distinguishing such features.
I think the main thing I'd point to is this section (where I've changed bullet points to numbers for easier reference):
I can’t convey all that experiential data here, so here are some rationalizations of why I’m partial to the term, inspired by the context of this post:The word “simulator” evokes a model of real processes which can be used to run virtual processes in virtual reality.It suggests an ontological distinction between the simulator and things that are simulated, and avoids the fallacy of attributing contingent properties of the latter to the former.It’s not confusing that multiple simulacra can be instantiated at once, or an agent embedded in a tragedy, etc.It does not imply that the AI’s behavior is well-described (globally or locally) as expected utility maximization. An arbitrarily powerful/accurate simulation can depict arbitrarily hapless sims.It does not imply that the AI is only capable of emulating things with direct precedent in the training data. A physics simulation, for instance, can simulate any phenomena that plays by its rules.It emphasizes the role of the model as a transition rule that evolves processes over time. The power of factored cognition / chain-of-thought reasoning is obvious.It emphasizes the role of the state in specifying and constructing the agent/process. The importance of prompt programming for capabilities is obvious if you think of the prompt as specifying a configuration that will be propagated forward in time.It emphasizes the interactive nature of the model’s predictions – even though they’re “just text”, you can converse with simulacra, explore virtual environments, etc.It’s clear that in order to actually do anything (intelligent, useful, dangerous, etc), the model must act through simulation of something.
I can’t convey all that experiential data here, so here are some rationalizations of why I’m partial to the term, inspired by the context of this post:
I think (2)-(8) are basically correct, (1) isn't really a claim, and (9) seems either false or vacuous. So I mostly feel like the core thesis as expressed in this post is broadly correct, not wrong. (I do feel like people have taken it further than is warranted, e.g. by expecting internal mechanisms to actually involve simulations, but I don't think those claims are in this post.)
I also think it does in fact constrain expectations. Here's a claim that I think this post points to: "To predict what a base model will do, figure out what real-world process was most likely to produce the context so far, then predict what text that real-world process would produce next, then adopt that as your prediction for what GPT would do". Taken literally this is obviously false (e.g. you can know that GPT is not going to factor a large prime). But it's a good first-order approximation, and I would still use that as an important input if I were to predict today how a base model is going to continue to complete text.
(Based on your other comments maybe you disagree with the last paragraph? That surprises me. I want to check that you are specifically thinking of base models and not RLHF'd or instruction tuned models.)
Personally I agree with janus that these are (and were) mostly obvious and uncontroversial things -- to people who actually played with / thought about LLMs. But I'm not surprised that LWers steeped in theoretical / conceptual thinking about EU maximizers and instrumental convergence without much experience with practical systems (at least at the time this post was written) found these claims / ideas to be novel.