Epistemic status: most elements are not new, but the synthesis seems useful.
Here is an alignment protocol that I call "autocalibrated quantilzed debate" (AQD).
Arguably the biggest concern with naive debate[1] is that perhaps a superintelligent AI can attack a human brain in a manner that takes it out of the regime of quasi-rational reasoning altogether, in which case the framing of "arguments and counterargument" doesn't make sense anymore. Let's call utterances that have this property "Lovecraftian". To counter this, I suggest using quantilization. Quantilization postulates that the true utility function is the difference between the proxy utility function and an unknown adversarial cost function with bounded expected value w.r.t. some base distribution. For debate, we can imagine the cost function to measure the extent to which a particular utterance is Lovecraftian. It also protects us from Cartesian daemons. There are several candidates for the base distribution:
The issue with this is that it might be hard to choose the quantilization parameter. An error in one direction produces a system which is too weak for pivotal acts. An error in the other direction produces an unsafe system. However, it seems likely that there is some range of parameters which is okay: arguably, the optimization power needed to produce a natural language description of a pivotal act[3] is not as big as the optimization power required for Lovecraftian utterances. Indeed, it seems unlikely we could design Lovecraftian utterances ourselves in the foreseeable future, so if solving alignment is not easier then it's hopeless anyway.
To address this, I propose the following "autocalibration" procedure. Let α1,α2… be a sequence of quantilization parameters, starting from extremely aggressive (definitely safe) and then becoming gradually less aggressive (stronger optimization, weaker safety) s.t. we can be reasonably sure it doesn't skip over the target range. For each i, we consider an αi-quantilized debate about the question "is replacing αi-quantilized debate by αi+1-quantilized debate a good idea?". We can then imagine executing this sequence of debates until the point where the answer switches from "yes" to "no".
Now, this sequence might be impractically time consuming. To address this, we can introduce a prediction system which predicts the outcomes of debates without having to actually run them. Notice that this is more viable than e.g. amplifying human imitation via prediction, because in this case we are predicting a low-dimensional signal whereas with imitation we have a high-dimensional signal with a much lower-dimensional but unknown subspace of relevant features. Ofc this system has to be hardened[2:1] against daemons. Once the optimal quantilization parameter has been determined, we can use it for a debate about the pivotal act.
There are various further nuances that should be considered:
Finally, we also need to deal with non-Cartesian daemons. For this, let's consider a "Turing" setting, i.e. a machine learning "core" connected to an external computer "envelope". We assume that the core is not powerful enough to host a non-Cartesian daemon all by itself. We then protect ourselves by applying quantilization to the envelope actions as well. We might also be able to design a more detailed prior about dangerous programs than about Lovecraftian utterances. This requires to autocalibrate at least two parameters, which seems doable: for example, increase both parameters together until you hit the Pareto frontier, then optimize along the frontier. A weakness in this approach is that, for very aggressive quantilization the prediction system will become too weak to be useful, but perhaps this can be compensated by the more detailed prior.
Without anything like factored cognition, which I am skeptical about. ↩︎
To deal with Cartesian daemons we (i) only make predictions about the counterfactual in which the prediction wasn't made (ii) only produce predictions when they pass a confidence threshold (iii) use a physicalist prior (to be defined in a future post). [EDIT: Actually, this doesn't work] Non-Cartesian daemons are addressed below. ↩︎ ↩︎
Including instructions for designing a different aligned AI. ↩︎
This entire approach is the polar opposite's of MIRI's "avoid human models" strategy, nevertheless it seems viable. ↩︎
The main issues with anti-goodharting that I see is the difficulty of defining proxy utility and base distribution, the difficulty of making it corrigible, not locking-in into fixed proxy utility and base distribution, and the question of what to do about optimization that points out of scope.
The proxy utility in debate is perfectly well-defined: it is the ruling of the human judge. For the base distribution I also made some concrete proposals (which certainly might be improvable but are not obviously bad). As to corrigibility, I think it's an ill-posed... (read more)