To be legible, evidence of misalignment probably has to be behavioral

[-]Rohin Shah7mo40

In some sense I agree with this post, but I'm not sure who the intended audience is, or what changes anyone should make. What existing work seems like it will generate "evidence which is just from fancy internals-based methods (and can't be supported by human inspection of AI behavior)", and that is the primary story for why it is impactful? I don't think this is true of probing, SAEs, circuit analysis, debate, ...

[-]ryan_greenblatt7mo62

This is often important in my thinking: when thinking about various internals based methods that could test for scheming (but won't produce direct behavioral evidence), this comes up. I wrote this doc after noticing that I wanted to reference this somewhere.

Also, I often hear people discuss getting non-behavioral evidence for scheming using internals/interp. (As an example, probes for detecting deceptive cognition and then seeing if this fire more than expected on honeypots.) And, understanding this isn't going to result in legible evidence is important for understanding the theory of change for this work: it's important that you can iterate usefully against the method. I think people sometimes explicitly model iterating against these testing methods, but sometimes they don't.

Maybe this doesn't come up as much in your conversation with people, but I've seen internals based testing methods which don't clearly ground out in behavioral evidence discussed often.

(E.g., it's the application that the Anthropic interp team has most discussed, it's the most obvious application of probing for internal deceptive reasoning other than resampling against the probes.)

Notably Dario seemingly thinks that circuit style interp analysis (which IMO would be unlikely to yield behavioral evidence on it's own) is the main way we might get definitive (aka legible) evidence of scheming. So, I think Dario's essay on interp is an example of someone disagreeing with this post! Dario's essay on interp came out after this post was published, otherwise I might have referenced it.

I wasn't trying to trigger any research particular reprioritization with this post, but I historically found that people hadn't really thought through this (relatively obvious once noted) consideration and I think people are sometimes interested in thinking through specific theories of impact for their work.

[-]ryan_greenblatt7mo*54

Here is the quote from Dario:

More subtly, the same opacity makes it hard to find definitive evidence supporting the existence of these risks at a large scale, making it hard to rally support for addressing them—and indeed, hard to know for sure how dangerous they are.

To address the severity of these alignment risks, we will have to see inside AI models much more clearly than we can today. For example, one major concern is AI deception or power-seeking. The nature of AI training makes it possible that AI systems will develop, on their own, an ability to deceive humans and an inclination to seek power in a way that ordinary deterministic software never will; this emergent nature also makes it difficult to detect and mitigate such developments2. But by the same token, we’ve never seen any solid evidence in truly real-world scenarios of deception and power-seeking3 because we can’t “catch the models red-handed” thinking power-hungry, deceitful thoughts. What we’re left with is vague theoretical arguments that deceit or power-seeking might have the incentive to emerge during the training process, which some people find thoroughly compelling and others laughably unconvincing. Honestly I can sympathize with both reactions, and this might be a clue as to why the debate over this risk has become so polarized.

IMO, this implies that interp would allow for rallying support while it would be hard otherwise, implying the behavioral evidence isn't key.

[-]Rohin Shah7mo30

I feel like the natural idea here is that interp generates understanding and then you use the understanding to generate behavioral evidence. Idk if this is what Dario has in mind but it at least seems plausible.

[-]Rohin Shah7mo20

Hmm, maybe we do disagree. I personally like circuit style interp analysis as a way to get evidence of scheming. But this is because I expect that after you do the circuit analysis you will then be able to use the generated insight to create behavioral evidence, assuming the circuit analysis worked at all. (Similarly to e.g. the whale + baseball = shark adversarial example.)

Maybe this doesn't come up as much in your conversation with people, but I've seen internals based testing methods which don't clearly ground out in behavioral evidence discussed often.
(E.g., it's the application that the Anthropic interp team has most discussed, it's the most obvious application of probing for internal deceptive reasoning other than resampling against the probes.)

The Anthropic discussion seems to be about making a safety case, which seems different from generating evidence of scheming. I haven't been imagining that if Anthropic fails to make a specific type of safety cases, they then immediately start trying to convince the world that models are scheming (as opposed to e.g. making other mitigations more stringent).

I think if a probe for internal deceptive reasoning works well enough, then once it actually fires, you could then do some further work to turn it into legible evidence of scheming (or learn that it was a false positive), so I feel like the considerations in this post don't apply.

I wasn't trying to trigger any research particular reprioritization with this post, but I historically found that people hadn't really thought through this (relatively obvious once noted) consideration and I think people are sometimes interested in thinking through specific theories of impact for their work.

Fair enough. I would be sad if people moved away from e.g. probing for deceptive reasoning or circuit analysis because they now think that these methods can't help produce legible evidence of misalignment (which would seem incorrect to me), which seems like the most likely effect of a post like this. But I agree with the general norm of just saying true things that people are interested in without worrying too much about these kinds of effects.

[-]Aaron_Scher7mo30

I think your main point is probably right but was not well argued here. It seems like the argument is a vibe argument of like "nah they probably won't find this evidence compelling".

You could also make an argument from past examples where there has been large action to address risks in the world, and look at the evidence there (e.g., banning of CFCs, climate change more broadly, tobacco regulation, etc.)

You could also make an argument from existing evidence around AI misbehavior and how its being dealt with, where (IMO) 'evidence much stronger than internals' basically doesn't seem to affect the public conversation outside the safety community (or even much here).

I think it's also worth saying a thing very directly: just because non-behavioral evidence isn't likely to be widely legible and convincing does not mean it is not useful evidence for those trying to have correct beliefs. Buck's previous post and many others discuss the rough epistemic situation when it comes to detecting misalignment. Internals evidence is going to be one of the tools in the toolkit, and it will be worth keeping in mind.

Another thing worth saying: if you think scheming is plausible, and you think it will be difficult to update against scheming from behavioral evidence (Buck's post), and you think non-behavioral evidence is not likely to be widely convincing (this post), then the situation looks really rough.

[-]ryan_greenblatt7mo30

I think your main point is probably right but was not well argued here.

Fair, I though that an example would make this sufficiently obvious that it wasn't worth arguing for at length but I should have spelled it out a bit more.

I think it's also worth saying a thing very directly: just because non-behavioral evidence isn't likely to be widely legible and convincing does not mean it is not useful evidence for those trying to have correct beliefs.

FWIW, I do say this under "These techniques could be quite useful via two mechanisms:".

[-]Francesca Gomez7mo2-1

I think you make some good points here, but there's an additional mechanism by which I believe internal-based techniques have the potential to make people intervene strongly on suspected misaligned behaviour.

This is whereby (in pre-superintelligent models) we are able to establish a strong correlation between misaligned AI behaviour examples understandable to humans and some model internals e.g. a deception probe. If there is strong empirical evidence establishing a link (I'm not strongly confident this will be the case, but mildly optimistic), then as we move to superintelligent models, I believe people will be more likely to take action on evidence from model internals alone, especially if above a certain threshold for likelihood.

My reasoning for this relates to example today such as medical interventions which are taken as a result of EEG data (electrical activity in brain) even if no external behavioral signs are present (or ever present), but because there is enough evidence that certain patterns act as early warning signs for medical issues.

While there are obviously material differences between the 'cost' of these decisions, it does give me encouragement that people will place a high level of confidence in signals which aren't directly interpetable to humans if a statistical correlation has been established with previously observed behaviour.

I think this holds true only in a situation where there is positive intent by decision makers to actually accurately detect misaligned behaviour, as without human understable behavioural examples, internal-based signals would be easier to dismiss if that was the intent of the decision maker.

[-]Dusto8mo10

Honestly I think this can go one step further and require that the behavioural output be something of more substance than text of what the model says it would do, or chain of thought pondering. I'm thinking more of the lines of the honeypot work. I suspect we are interested in convincing similar people about AI safety and will likely get the "cool, come back to me when the models start actually doing bad things" responses if we aren't able to provide concrete examples of model capability.

[-]Buck8mo43

Ryan agrees, the main thing he means by "behavioral output" is what you're saying: an actually really dangerous action.

We can push the frontier of what humans can understand using recursive oversight techniques like debate which might allow for eliciting explanations that allow for humans to understand how the action is problematic (e.g., pointing out exactly what the problematic behavior is and explaining how to test this in isolation). However, if the problematic nature of an action is sufficiently subtle and/or complex (perhaps due to the AI having superhuman understanding), then even well elicited debate might be unable to provide a good enough explanation. We might have hoped that internals-based methods could push frontier beyond debate (perhaps to indefinite worst case scalability) while still producing legible and convincing evidence, but I'll argue that non-behavioral evidence is unlikely to be convincing. This suggests an upper bound on strategies which depend on legible evidence: once well elicited debate (and other methods for improving human understanding) aren't viable, misaligned AIs can get away with doing bad actions without these actions resulting in legible evidence of misalignment. ↩︎
That is, relevant humans, this approach might work for eliciting a strong response from AIs once AIs make the important decisions. ↩︎
That is, it must at least partially bottom out behaviorally. Internals-based evidence which is substantially behaviorally supported (in a relatively direct way) could suffice. E.g., if we can read off the AI's internal reasoning using some fancy method, it looks quite malign, and the malign aspects of the reasoning are also quite predictive of the AI's behavior, this could suffice. For instance, Alignment Faking in Large Language Models utilized a mixture of inspecting the Chain-of-Thought and behavioral evidence in a relatively effective way. ↩︎
Presumably, the actual level of usefulness might be substantially lower as the AI is a misaligned AI trying to disempower humans. ↩︎
I added this paragraph in an edit because it seemed like an important additional hope. ↩︎

AI ALIGNMENT FORUM
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AI ALIGNMENT FORUM
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To be legible, evidence of misalignment probably has to be behavioral

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