A week ago I recorded a prediction on AI timeline after reading a Vox article on GPT-3 . In general I'm much more spread out in time than the Lesswrong community. Also, I weigh more heavily outside view considerations than detailed inside view information. For example, a main consideration of my prediction is using the heurastic With 50% probability, things will last twice as long as they already have, with the starting time of 1956, the time of the Dartmouth College summer AI conference.
If AGI will definitely happen eventually, then the heuristic gives us [21.3, 64, 192] years at the [25th, 50th, 75th] percentiles of AGI to occur. AGI may never happen, but the chance of that is small enough that adjusting for that here will not make a big difference (I put ~10% that AGI will not happen for 500 years or more, but it already matches that distribution quite well).
A more inside view consideration is: what happens if the current machine learning paradigm scales to AGI? Given that assumption, a 50% confidence interval might be [2028, 2045] (since the current burst of machine learning research began in 2012-2013), which is more in line with the Lesswrong predictions and Metaculus community prediction . Taking the super outside view consideration and the outside view-ish consideration together, I get the prediction I made a week ago.
I adapted my prediction to the timeline of this post , and compared it with some other commenters predictions .
Here is my Elicit Snapshot.
I'll follow the definition of AGI given in this Metaculus challenge, which roughly amounts to a single model that can "see, talk, act, and reason." My predicted distribution is a weighted sum of two component distributions described below:
My probability for Prosaic AGI is based on an estimated probability of each of the 3 stages of development working (described above):
P(Prosaic AGI) = P(Stage 1) x P(Stage 2) x P(Stage 3) = 3/4 x 2/3 x 1/2 = 1/4
Updates/Clarification after some feedback from Adam Gleave:
Here is my snapshot. My reasoning is basically similar to Ethan Perez', it's just that I think that if transformative AI is achievable in the next five orders of magnitude of compute improvement (e.g. prosaic AGI?), it will likely be achieved in the next five years or so. I also am slightly more confident that it is, and slightly less confident that TAI will ever be achieved.
I am aware that my timelines are shorter than most... Either I'm wrong and I'll look foolish, or I'm right and we're doomed. Sucks to be me.
[Edited the snapshot slightly on 8/23/2020]
[Edited to add the following powerpoint slide that gets a bit more at my reasoning]
Here's my answer. I'm pretty uncertain compared to some of the others!
First, I'm assuming that by AGI we mean an agent-like entity that can do the things associated with general intelligence, including things like planning towards a goal and carrying that out. If we end up in a CAIS-like world where there is some AI service or other that can do most economically useful tasks, but nothing with very broad competence, I count that as never developing AGI.
I've been impressed with GPT-3, and could imagine it or something like it scaling to produce near-human level responses to language prompts in a few years, especially with RL-based extensions.
But, following the list (below) of missing capabilities by Stuart Russell, I still think things like long-term planning would elude GPT-N, so it wouldn't be agentive general intelligence. Even though you might get those behaviours with trivial extensions of GPT-N, I don't think it's very likely.
That's why I think AGI before 2025 is very unlikely (not enough time for anything except scaling up of existing methods). This is also because I tend to expect progress to be continuous, though potentially quite fast, and going from current AI to AGI in less than 5 years requires a very sharp discontinuity.
AGI before 2035 or so happens if systems quite a lot like current deep learning can do the job, but which aren't just trivial extensions of them - this seems reasonable to me on the inside view - e.g. it takes us less than 15 years to take GPT-N and add layers on top of it that handle things like planning and discovering new actions. This is probably my 'inside view' answer.
I put a lot of weight on a tail peaking around 2050 because of how quickly we've advanced up this 'list of breakthroughs needed for general intelligence' -
There is this list of remaining capabilities needed for AGI in an older post I wrote, with the capabilities of 'GPT-6' as I see them underlined:
Stuart Russell’s List
human-like language comprehension
discovering new action sets
managing its own mental activity
For reference, I’ve included two capabilities we already have that I imagine being on a similar list in 1960
So we'd have discovering new action sets, and managing mental activity - effectively, the things that facilitate long-range complex planning, remaining.
So (very oversimplified) if around the 1980s we had efficient search algorithms, by 2015 we had image recognition (basic perception) and by 2025 we have language comprehension courtesy of GPT-8, that leaves cumulative learning (which could be obtained by advanced RL?), then discovering new action sets and managing mental activity (no idea). It feels a bit odd that we'd breeze past all the remaining milestones in one decade after it took ~6 to get to where we are now. Say progress has sped up to be twice as fast, then it's 3 more decades to go. Add to this the economic evidence from things like Modelling the Human Trajectory, which suggests a roughly similar time period of around 2050.
Finally, I think it's unlikely but not impossible that we never build AGI and instead go for tool AI or CAIS, most likely because we've misunderstood the incentives such that it isn't actually economical or agentive behaviour doesn't arise easily. Then there's the small (few percent) chance of catastrophic or existential disaster which wrecks our ability to invent things. This is the one I'm most unsure about - I put 15% for both but it may well be higher.
Here's my quick forecast, to get things going. Probably if anyone asks me questions about it I'll realise I'm embarrassed by it and change it.
It has three buckets:
10%: We get to AGI with the current paradigm relatively quickly without major bumps.
60%: We get to it eventually sometime in the next ~50 years.
30%: We manage to move into a stable state where nobody can unilaterally build an AGI, then we focus on alignment for as long as it takes before we build it.
Adele Lopez is right that 30% is super optimistic. Also I accidentally put a bunch within '2080-2100', instead of 'after 2100'. And also I thought about it more. here's my new one.
It has four buckets:
20% Current work leads directly into AI in the next 15 years.
55% There are some major bottlenecks, new insights needed, and some engineering projects comparable in size to the manhattan project. This is 2035 to 2070.
10% This is to fill out 2070 to 2100.
15% We manage to move to a stable state, or alternatively civilizational collapse / non-AI x-risk stops AI research. This is beyond 2100.
My rough take: https://elicit.ought.org/builder/oTN0tXrHQ
3 buckets, similar to Ben Pace's
If I thought about this for 5 additional hours, I can imagine assigning the following ranges to the scenarios:
Roughly my feelings: https://elicit.ought.org/builder/trBX3uNCd
Reasoning: I think lots of people have updated too much on GPT-3, and that the current ML paradigms are still missing key insights into general intelligence. But I also think enough research is going into the field that it won't take too long to reach those insights.
To the extent that it differs from others' predictions, probably the most important factor is that I think even if AGI is hard, there are a number of ways in which human civilization could become capable of doing almost arbitrarily hard things, like through human intelligence enhancement or sufficiently transformative narrow AI. I think that means the question is less about how hard AGI is and more about general futurism than most people think. It's moderately hard for me to imagine how business as usual could go on for the rest of the century, but who knows.
My snapshot: https://elicit.ought.org/builder/xPoVZh7Xq
Idk what we mean by "AGI", so I'm predicting when transformative AI will be developed instead. This is still a pretty fuzzy target: at what point do we say it's "transformative"? Does it have to be fully deployed and we already see the huge economic impact? Or is it just the point at which the model training is complete? I'm erring more on the side of "when the model training is complete", but also there may be lots of models contributing to TAI, in which case it's not clear which particular model we mean. Nonetheless, this feels a lot more concrete and specific than AGI.
Methodology: use a quantitative model, and then slightly change the prediction to account for important unmodeled factors. I expect to write about this model in a future newsletter.
If AGI is taken to mean, the first year that there is radical economic, technological, or scientific progress, then these are my AGI timelines.
I have a bit lower probability for near-term AGI than many people here are. I model my biggest disagreement as about how much work is required to move from high-cost impressive demos to real economic performance. I also have an intuition that it is really hard to automate everything and progress will be bottlenecked by the tasks that are essential but very hard to automate.
Here is a link to my forecast
And here are the rough justifications for this distribution:
I don't have much else to add beyond what others have posted, though it's in part influenced by an AIRCS event I attended in the past. Though I do remember being laughed at for suggesting GPT-2 represented a very big advance toward AGI.
I've also never really understood the resistance to why current models of AI are incapable of AGI. Sure, we don't have AGI with current models, but how do we know it isn't a question of scale? Our brains are quite efficient, but the total energy consumption is comparable to that of a light bulb. I find it very hard to believe that a server farm in an Amazon, Microsoft, or Google Datacenter would be incapable of running the final AGI algorithm. And for all the talk of the complexity in the brain, each neuron is agonizingly slow (200-300Hz).
That's also to say nothing of the fact that the vast majority of brain matter is devoted to sensory processing. Advances in autonomous vehicles are already proving that isn't an insurmountable challenge.
Current AI models are performing very well at pattern recognition. Isn't that most of what our brains do anyway?
Self attended recurrent transformer networks with some improvements to memory (attention context) access and recall to me look very similar to our own brain. What am I missing?