The Best of LessWrong

AI ALIGNMENT FORUM
The Best of LessWrong
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9Daniel Kokotajlo

I still think this is great. Some minor updates, and an important note: Minor updates: I'm a bit less concerned about AI-powered propaganda/persuasion than I was at the time, not sure why. Maybe I'm just in a more optimistic mood. See this critique for discussion. It's too early to tell whether reality is diverging from expectation on this front. I had been feeling mildly bad about my chatbot-centered narrative, as of a month ago, but given how ChatGPT was received I think things are basically on trend. Diplomacy happened faster than I expected, though in a less generalizeable way than I expected, so whatever. My overall timelines have shortened somewhat since I wrote this story, but it's still the thing I point people towards when they ask me what I think will happen. (Note that the bulk of my update was from publicly available info rather than from nonpublic stuff I saw at OpenAI.) Important note: When I wrote this story, my AI timelines median was something like 2029. Based on how things shook out as the story developed it looked like AI takeover was about to happen, so in my unfinished draft of what 2027 looks like, AI takeover happens. (Also AI takeoff begins, I hadn't written much about that part but probably it would reach singularity/dysonswarms/etc. in around 2028 or 2029.) That's why the story stopped, I found writing about takeover difficult and confusing & I wanted to get the rest of the story up online first. Alas, I never got around to finishing the 2027 story. I'm mentioning this because I think a lot of readers with 20+ year timelines read my story and were like "yep seems about right" not realizing that if you look closely at what's happening in the story, and imagine it happening in real life, it would be pretty strong evidence that crazy shit was about to go down. Feel free to controvert that claim, but the point is, I want it on the record that when this original 2026 story was written, I envisioned the proper continuation of the story resultin

7Orpheus16

ELK was one of my first exposures to AI safety. I participated in the ELK contest shortly after moving to Berkeley to learn more about longtermism and AI safety. My review focuses on ELK’s impact on me, as well as my impressions of how ELK affected the Berkeley AIS community. Things about ELK that I benefited from Understanding ARC’s research methodology & the builder-breaker format. For me, most of the value of ELK came from seeing ELK’s builder-breaker research methodology in action. Much of the report focuses on presenting training strategies and presenting counterexamples to those strategies. This style of thinking is straightforward and elegant, and I think the examples in the report helped me (and others) understand ARC’s general style of thinking. Understanding the alignment problem. ELK presents alignment problems in a very “show, don’t tell” fashion. While many of the problems introduced in ELK have been written about elsewhere, ELK forces you to think through the reasons why your training strategy might produce a dishonest agent (the human simulator) as opposed to an honest agent (the direct translator). The interactive format helped me more deeply understand some of the ways in which alignment is difficult. Common language & a shared culture. ELK gave people a concrete problem to work on. A whole subculture emerged around ELK, with many junior alignment researchers using it as their first opportunity to test their fit for theoretical alignment research. There were weekend retreats focused on ELK. It was one of the main topics that people were discussing from Jan-Feb 2022. People shared their training strategy ideas over lunch and dinner. It’s difficult to know for sure what kind of effect this had on the community as a whole. But at least for me, my current best-guess is that this shared culture helped me understand alignment, increased the amount of time I spent thinking/talking about alignment, and helped me connect with peers/collaborators who we

32habryka

I think this post might be the best one of all the MIRI dialogues. I also feel confused about how to relate to the MIRI dialogues overall. A lot of the MIRI dialogues consist of Eliezer and Nate saying things that seem really important and obvious to me, and a lot of my love for them comes from a feeling of "this actually makes a bunch of the important arguments for why the problem is hard". But the nature of the argument is kind of closed off. Like, I agree with these arguments, but like, if you believe these arguments, having traction on AI Alignment becomes much harder, and a lot of things that people currently label "AI Alignment" kind of stops feeling real, and I have this feeling that even though a really quite substantial fraction of the people I talk to about AI Alignment are compelled by Eliezer's argument for difficulty, that there is some kind of structural reason that AI Alignment as a field can't really track these arguments. Like, a lot of people's jobs and funding rely on these arguments being false, and also, if these arguments are correct, the space of perspectives on the problem suddenly loses a lot of common ground on how to proceed or what to do, and it isn't really obvious that you even want an "AI Alignment field" or lots of "AI Alignment research organizations" or "AI Alignment student groups". Like, because we don't know how to solve this problem, it really isn't clear what the right type of social organization is, and there aren't obviously great gains from trade, and so from a coalition perspective, you don't get a coalition of people who think these arguments are real. I feel deeply confused about this. Over the last two years, I think I wrongly ended up just kind of investing into an ecosystem of people that somewhat structurally can't really handle these arguments, and makes plans that assume that these arguments are false, and in doing so actually mostly makes the world worse, by having a far too optimistic stance on the differen

21nostalgebraist

This post provides a valuable reframing of a common question in futurology: "here's an effect I'm interested in -- what sorts of things could cause it?" That style of reasoning ends by postulating causes. But causes have a life of their own: they don't just cause the one effect you're interested in, through the one causal pathway you were thinking about. They do all kinds of things. In the case of AI and compute, it's common to ask * Here's a hypothetical AI technology. How much compute would it require? But once we have an answer to this question, we can always ask * Here's how much compute you have. What kind of AI could you build with it? If you've asked the first question, you ought to ask the second one, too. The first question includes a hidden assumption: that the imagined technology is a reasonable use of the resources it would take to build. This isn't always true: given those resources, there may be easier ways to accomplish the same thing, or better versions of that thing that are equally feasible. These facts are much easier to see when you fix a given resource level, and ask yourself what kinds of things you could do with it. This high-level point seems like an important contribution to the AI forecasting conversation. The impetus to ask "what does future compute enable?" rather than "how much compute might TAI require?" influenced my own view of Bio Anchors, an influence that's visible in the contrarian summary at the start of this post. ---------------------------------------- I find the specific examples much less convincing than the higher-level point. For the most part, the examples don't demonstrate that you could accomplish any particular outcome applying more compute. Instead, they simply restate the idea that more compute is being used. They describe inputs, not outcomes. The reader is expected to supply the missing inference: "wow, I guess if we put those big numbers in, we'd probably get magical results out." But this

6Ben Pace

Returning to this essay, it continues to be my favorite Paul post (even What Failure Looks Like only comes second), and I think it's the best way to engage with Paul's work than anything else (including the Eliciting Latent Knowledge document, which feels less grounded in the x-risk problem, is less in Paul's native language, and gets detailed on just one idea for 10x the space thus communicating less of the big picture research goal). I feel I can understand all the arguments made in this post. I think this should be mandatory reading before reading Eliciting Latent Knowledge. Overview of why: * The motivation behind most of proposals Paul has spent a lot of time (iterated amplification, imitative generalization) on are explained clearly and succinctly. * For a quick summary, this involves * A proposal for useful ML-systems designed with human feedback * An argument that the human-feedback ML-systems will have flaws that kill you * A proposal for using ML assistants to debug the original ML system * An argument that the ML systems will not be able to understand the original human-feedback ML-systems * A proposal for training the human-feedback ML-systems in a way that requires understandability * An argument that this proposal is uncompetitive * ??? (I believe the proposals in the ELK document are the next step here) * A key problem when evaluating very high-IQ, impressive, technical work, is that it is unclear which parts of the work you do not understand because you do not understand an abstract technical concept, and which parts are simply judgment calls based on the originator of the idea. This post shows very clearly which is which — many of the examples and discussions are technical, but the standard for "plausible failure story" and "sufficiently precise algorithm" and "sufficiently doomed" are all judgment calls, as are the proposed solutions. I'm not even sure I get on the bus at step 1, that the right next step is to consider ML

8DragonGod

Epistemic Status I am an aspiring selection theorist and I have thoughts. ---------------------------------------- Why Selection Theorems? Learning about selection theorems was very exciting. It's one of those concepts that felt so obviously right. A missing component in my alignment ontology that just clicked and made everything stronger. Selection Theorems as a Compelling Agent Foundations Paradigm There are many reasons to be sympathetic to agent foundations style safety research as it most directly engages the hard problems/core confusions of alignment/safety. However, one concern with agent foundations research is that we might build sky high abstraction ladders that grow increasingly disconnected from reality. Abstractions that don't quite describe the AI systems we deal with in practice. I think that in presenting this post, Wentworth successfully sidestepped the problem. He presented an intuitive story for why the Selection Theorems paradigm would be fruitful; it's general enough to describe many paradigms of AI system development, yet concrete enough to say nontrivial/interesting things about the properties of AI systems (including properties that bear on their safety). Wentworth presents a few examples of extant selection theorems (most notably the coherence theorems) and later argues that selection theorems have a lot of research "surface area" and new researchers could be onboarded (relatively) quickly. He also outlined concrete steps people interested in selection theorems could take to contribute to the program. Overall, I found this presentation of the case for selection theorems research convincing. I think that selection theorems provide a solid framework with which to formulate (and prove) safety desiderata/guarantees for AI systems that are robust to arbitrary capability amplification. Furthermore, selection theorems seem to be very robust to paradigm shifts in the development artificial intelligence. That is regardless of what

AI ALIGNMENT FORUM
The Best of LessWrong
AF

AI ALIGNMENT FORUM
The Best of LessWrong
AF

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